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ABSTRACT
 
Since the mid 1980s Latin American and Caribbean countries have 
unilaterally liberalized their economies and have started a new wave of 
economic integration that led to the establishment of 25 trade agreements 
between 1990 and 1994. The Group of Three (G-3) Free Trade Agreement, 
comprising Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela, provided for the 
liberalization of around 62 percent of exportables from Colombia and 
Venezuela and 16 percent of those from Mexico_ This paper provides a 
qualitative assessment of the potential impact of the G-3 on member 
countries' agricultural trade. Its major conclusion is that the agreement is 
unlikely to produce important changes either in the structure of member 
countries' agricultural trade or in bilateral trade flows. This is due to a set of 
factors among which are the relatively limited number of products included 
in the agreement and their lack of importance within member countries' 
trade, the modest size of pre-agreement trade, and the size of the markets 
involved. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. First, the most important recent 
developments in G-3 member countries' agricultural policies are described. 
Then, the general characteristics of the agreement are presented, giving 
special emphasis to the agricultural provisions. Finally, a qualitative 
assessment of the latter is done through their hypothetical application to the 
current structure of agricultural trade among member countries. Data on G­
3 agricultural trade are presented in appendix 2. ­
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Introduction 
Since the mid 1980s Latin American economies have started a new wave of 
economic integration. After the limited success of different subregional 
integration schemes in the framework of the Import Substitution 
Industrialization strategy, Latin American economies have shifted towards 
unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization and the promotion of 
schemes of economic integration aimed at fostering the export sector. The 
formation of a Western Hemisphere Free Trade Area, projected for the year 
2005, constitutes the ultimate expression of the 'new' process of economic 
integration in the Americas. 
In 1989 the Group of Three (Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela), which had 
started as a mechanism for peace talks in various Central American 
countries (known as the Contadora Group), extended its activities to the 
economic field. By this means, the three countries initiated negotiations 
directed towards the formation of a free trade area. Effective in January 1995, 
the Group of Three (G-3) Free Trade Agreement liberalized trade among the 
three countries over a wide range of products, guaranteed national 
treatment for partner countries' investment, and ruled over trade-related 
matters such as intellectual property rights, mechanisms for dispute 
resolution, and harmonization of customs regulations (rules of origin, 
inspection procedures, etc.). 
The G-3 Free Trade Agreement is part of a set of 25 trade agreements that 
­
were established among Latin American and Caribbean countries between 
1990 and 1994. Common objectives of most of these accords refer to the 
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expansion of domestic markets, the enhancement of competitiveness for 
regional industries, the diversification of the export base, the promotion of 
foreign investment, and the strengthening of technological development 
and cooperation. The means to achieve these objectives are also common: 
elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade complemented with 
progressive de-regulation of the economy. 
As mentioned, the purpose of economic integration for Latin American 
countries is to boost the export sector, specializing their economies in the 
production of goods for which they have comparative advantage and 
deriving benefits from a more efficient allocation of resources. In terms of 
economic theory, the expectation is to benefit from the classical gains from 
trade. However, as trade liberalization is not complete and rather is done on 
a discriminatory basis (both in the sense of the limited group of countries 
involved and the groups of products that are effectively liberalized), its net 
economic outcome is uncertain. 
Even though Latin American countries have been unilaterally liberalizing 
their economies since the 1980s, the agricultural sector has remained 
relatively protected. The same situation is observed with respect to the 
formation of trade agreements and the G-3 Free Trade Agreement is no 
exception. This paper attempts to provide a description of some recent 
developments in G-3 member countries' agricultural policies, to present the 
most important characteristics of the G-3 Free Trade Agreement (with 
­
emphasis on the agricultural sector), and to assess qualitatively the potential 
impact of the agreement on member countries' agricultural trade. 
3
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The first chapter describes the 
current status of agricultural policies in the G-3's member countries. They 
provide the economic environment of the agreement. Chapter Two 
presents a brief discussion of the origin of the Group of Three and offers an 
overview of the general content of the G-3 Free Trade Agreement and its 
agricultural provisions. The examination of the G-3's agricultural 
provisions in the context of intra-G-3 agricultural trade is accomplished in 
Chapter Three and a qualitative assessment of their implications is 
performed. Finally, two appendices contain (1) the operational definition of 
the agricultural sector employed and (2) support data for Chapter Three. 
-

4
 
1. Overview of G-3 Agricultural Policies 
1.1 Colombian Agricultural Policy 
1.1.1 The Opening Up of the Colombian Economy 
Until 1990, Colombia had been recognized in international circles as an 
economically inward oriented country. Even though it "... has not always 
had a protectionist trade regime, external sector policies have been used 
frequently as an instrument of macroeconomic management of cycles in 
agricultural exports ..." (Hallberg and Takacs, 1992; p. 260) - and were long 
the major source of foreign exchange receipts. Only with the 
macroeconomic adjustment program accomplished during 1984-86, did 
macroeconomic policies start to be used for economic stabilization purposes 
and trade policy for promoting long-term export growth and diversification 
of exports (Hallberg and Takacs, 1992). 
The reforms of 1984-86 were able to stabilize the Colombian economy, 
reducing considerably the external imbalance and producing moderate rates 
of economic growth. Further stabilization measures were necessary in 1988­
89 due to the deterioration of the international price of coffee and increased 
fiscal pressures arising from the anti-drug policy (Hallberg and Takacs, 1992). 
Yet the government realized that stability alone does not lead to higher 
productivity or economic growth and there was a need for improving the 
competitiveness of the economy, especially if it is taken into account that 
­
the economic expansion in the years before 1990 "... may be characterized as 
5 
a succession of short-lived sectorial booms without a clearly discernible 
structural pattern." (Ocampo, 1992, p. 303) 
This situation, along with the growing number of other Latin American 
countries that have undertaken economic reforms that include trade 
liberalization 1 and the increasing interest in negotiating free trade 
agreements (FTAs)2, set the conditions for the launching of the Economic 
Modernization Program (EMP) in February 1990. This program, aimed at 
improving resource allocation efficiency and increasing competitiveness, 
had an ambitious trade reform as a keystone. This economic reform is 
usually referred to as the "Apertura" (opening up). 
1.1.2 Agricultural Trade Policy in the 'pre-Apertura' Period 
Until 1990 agricultural production was kept under a protectionist regime 
that sought to develop self-sufficiency in food and raw materials production 
and to stimulate exports by means of a wide variety of trade instruments. 
Tariffs, advance deposits, import licenses, import quotas, minimum prices, 
export quotas, tax incentives for exports, and a government monopoly on 
agricultural imports were used to achieve this goals. 
Like other products, agricultural imports were controlled through the 
mechanism of import licensing. As part of national macroeconomic policy, 
-

1 Chile -1974-79, Mexico -1983-88, Bolivia -1985-90, Venezuela -1989-93,
 
Brazil-1990, Peru -1990, and Argentina -1988-90.
 
2Not to mention the pressure exerted by international organizations such as
 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
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the Monetary Board determined the foreign exchange budget available for 
imports and the Foreign Trade Institute rationed it among the different 
importers by means of the import licensing system, thereby establishing 
quantitative limits on imports. Any item to be imported belonged to one of 
three categories (Hallberg and Takacs, 1992). First, items included in the free 
list were freely importable, paying their corresponding tariffs and 
surcharges, and included intermediate inputs, raw materials, and capital 
goods (neither of them competing with national products). Second were 
items under prior import licensing which included most consumer goods 
and other products which compete to some degree with national 
production. Third were items in the prohibited list (accounting for around 1 
percent of goods) which were forbidden because of health or safety 
considerations or because of their luxurious character. 
Table 1.1	 Percentage of Agricultural Products under Different Import 
Regimes in Colombia in the 'pre-Apertura' Period 
Free list Prior license Prohibited list 
Raw materials, animals 42 58 o 
Processed food 18 78 4 
Total under each system 34 63 3 
Source: Hallberg and Takacs (1992)
 
As Table 1.1 shows, the biggest portion of agricultural imports were subject
 
-

to prior import licensing, processed food being the highest proportion under 
this system. In the period immediately before the implementation of the 
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Economic Modernization Program (EMP), the average tariff for agricultural 
imports was 22 percent plus a surcharge of 18 percent. 
Besides the licensing and tariff systems, the Colombian government had a 
monopoly on the import of a substantial part of agricultural products, 
particularly grains and oils, through the Institute of Agricultural Marketing 
(IDEMA). In fact, IDEMA was intended to perform a regulatory function, 
importing products during periods of domestic production shortage and 
holding inventories to maintain adequate supply and prices. The 
differential between international and domestic prices (when favorable for 
the Institute) was used to help finance its activities. On the other hand, the 
government established minimum or guarantee prices that were 
administered by IDEMA. This institute acted as a buyer in the most 
important production areas as well as in those regions where the campesino 
sector worked in relative isolation from the national marketing network. 
This function permitted IDEMA to manage the set of instruments required 
to have complete regulatory power over a significant portion of the 
agricultural market. 
Nonetheless, in periods when the relationship between domestic and 
international prices favored the development of exports of products that 
were oriented primarily to the internal market, a system of export quotas 
was employed. This was intended to secure sufficient domestic supply, 
preventing rises in consumer prices but strangling any chance of selling to 
-

the international market. This was the case for products such as cattle, sugar, 
cocoa, and cotton. On the other hand, marketing of nontradables was left to 
a great extent to market forces and the government made very little effort to 
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regulate this process. The most significant result was the creation of central 
wholesale markets in various principal cities starting in the early seventies. 
Export promotion of agricultural products was encouraged with the 
establishment of an indirect tax rebate scheme (CERTs), the allocation of 
subsidized credit, and export promotion activities led by the Export 
Promotion Fund (PROEXPO). There are just a few cases in which the system 
produced positive results, most notably banana and flower exports. Picking 
up successful products and alternative ways to carryon the projects proved 
to be quite difficult. Moreover, it has been argued that the anti-export bias 
introduced by the Colombian 'pre-Apertura' import regime was so strong 
that export promotion measures "... would have had to average more than 
five times their 1989 levels in order to offset this bias, which would have 
represented a sum equal to about 20 percent of the fiscal budget. II (Hallberg 
and Takacs, 1992, p. 268) 
The diversity of treatment received by agricultural products makes it 
difficult to generalize about their implications. By 1986, agricultural 
products, on average, appeared to be unprotected as pointed out by Hallberg 
and Takacs: "[e]ffective protection estimates based on the differences 
between 1986 domestic and international prices showed a sharp 
discrimination in favor of industry (71 percent average effective protection) 
and against agriculture and mining (-8 percent). The estimates showed no 
correlation between effective protection as measured by price comparisons 
-

and the effective protection implicit in tariff rates ... [t]hese findings imply 
that tariffs merely placed a lower bound on protection for items for which 
QRs actually determined domestic prices. II (1992, p. 267-8). 
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It is clear that even though agricultural products are on average 
unprotected, importables have tended to be highly protected. Their degree of 
protection also depended on variables such as the exchange rate. Between 
1960 and 1969, the percentage difference between domestic and international 
prices tended to be positive (Le. policies were protectionist in their effects); 
from 1970 to 1976, this difference tended to be negative; and between 1977 
and 1987, with some variations, it tended to be protectionist. 
The major difference between the protectionism of the sixties and that of 
the seventies and eighties is that the latter was rather selective and tended 
to obey the needs of supplying the internal market, although not without 
costs. The results of this type of policy, according to de Pombo (1992), showed 
that "... some agricultural products lack comparative advantage. This had 
caused those products to lose ground as alternatives in the use of land (corn 
and soy) and as exportable products (rice and cotton) . .. When state 
intervention has had superfluous results and produced elevated costs for 
the national budget and for consumers, it becomes convenient to open 
markets to competition since it will bring about greater stability for growth, 
consolidation of technical advances, and better supply for the markets. II 
(p.183) 
1.1.3 Agricultural Policy in the 'Apertura' Period 
-

The EMP stated ambitious objectives for the agricultural sector. The 
Modernization and Diversification Program for the Agricultural Sector 
(MDP), which constitutes its sectorial plan, was aimed at increasing income 
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based upon It••• actions that are intended to guarantee its strengthening and 
expansion, improve its efficiency and productivity, and take into account 
the reality of production in the rural sector and domestic and foreign 
market characteristics." (de Pombo, 1992; p. 168) The key aspects of this 
program relate to (1) domestic and international marketing, (2) safeguards 
for national production, (3) infrastructure, (4) production costs, (5) 
generation and transfer of technology, and (6) credit. 
The elimination of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and the reduction in tariff 
levels for capital goods and inputs for the agricultural sector were the first 
steps in the completion of the MOP3. Later, considering that agricultural 
products used as intermediate goods had reduced import tariffs and that 
international competition was threatening for others, a price band 
mechanism was introduced in June 1991 as a stabilization device. Initially, 
six importable goods were subjected to this mechanism (rice, sorghum, corn, 
wheat, barley, and soybean) and afterwards two more were added (sugar and 
milk). 
Management of agricultural and livestock credit was centralized in a fund 
(FINAGRO), in an attempt to unify criteria applied in this field in aspects 
such as interest rates (eliminating subsidized interest rates with the 
exception of credit oriented to farmers in extreme poverty conditions), loan 
amounts, grace periods, payment timing, and eligibility of projects. 
-

3 At the end of 1990, It••• only twelve of a total of 395 tariff classifications for 
inputs and raw materials used by the agricultural and livestock sector [were] 
still subject to prior import licensing regulations ..." (de Pombo, 1992, p. 
169). 
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Two other institutional changes of importance were introduced. First, the 
creation of the National Technology System (SIMTAP) based on the 'semi­
privatization' of the former Colombian Agricultural Research Institute 
(lCA) and the promotion of private technical assistance units which operate 
preferentially on a regional basis. One of the foundations of this change is 
the aim to have a demand-driven research and technical assistance system. 
Second, the process of political and administrative decentralization has 
given municipalities responsibility for the management and financing of 
public technical assistance units (UMATA) as well as other services for the 
agricultural and livestock sectors (such as price information and training). 
As mentioned above, the 'tariffication' of QRs (that is, the substitution of 
tariffs and surcharges for the import licensing system) was one of the main 
instruments in modifying Colombian agricultural policy. By November 
1990, only 8 percent of agricultural products were placed under the prior 
licensing system while 92 percent were under the free list; according to their 
stage of processing, 92 percent of raw materials, animals, and agricultural 
products were under the free list regime, and 82 percent of the processed 
food products were also under this regime. At the same time, the average 
tariff for agricultural imports was reduced slightly to 20 percent and the 
tariff surcharge to 13 percent. 
These changes in tariffs did not appear to imply big consequences for the 
agricultural sector but the elimination of QRs and the subsequent abolition 
­
of the import monopoly exerted by IDEMA introduced new elements to 
sectorial trade. The 'Apertura' program contemplated the inclusion of 
distinctive instruments to deal with this particular situation; ", .. in 
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November [1990], the elimination of QRs for industrial products was 
completed with the transfer of all but 3 percent of tariff positions to the free 
list. The remaining 3 percent corresponded to (1) basic agricultural products 
and their derivatives, for which a variable tariff scheme was being designed, 
and (2) items restricted for health and safety reasons." (Hallberg and Takacs, 
1992, p. 270) 
The variable tariff scheme that Hallberg and Takacs referred to is based on a 
price band mechanism intended to safeguard domestic producers from the 
instability of international prices for agricultural products. As has been 
pointed out by The International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium ­
IATRC - (1994), under a trade regime based on tariffs and increasing 
international integration, the stabilization of domestic prices becomes a 
critical policy area. According to this organization (IATRC, 1994), most Latin 
American countries engaged in trade liberalization policies seem to be able 
to confront explicit export subsidies (as in the case of American wheat 
exports and European sugar and powder milk exports). However, they 
experienced difficulties with less explicit subsidization and with occasional 
exports at prices below the prevailing levels in the central markets of the 
concerned countries. "Extending trade preferences exposes producers of 
import-competing activities in countries that are residual markets for 
exports from trading partners in the region to face low and very unstable 
border prices from the regional suppliers." (IATRC, 1994; p.84) 
..
 
The use of the price band mechanism in Colombia was authorized within 
the regulations introduced by the International Trade Law of 1991. They 
were conceived as the means to determine whether or not to adjust 
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(upward or downward) custom tariffs established for agricultural 
importables, its substitutes and derivatives. According to this law, the 
variable tariff policy was intended to "... stabilize the import costs of 
agricultural products or agroindustrial products related to them whenever 
their prices could be highly unstable in international markets." (quoted in 
Reyes and Ramirez, 1993) 
Even though the price band mechanism is undoubtedly the most important 
element in the agricultural trade policy of the 'Apertura' period in 
Colombia, there has been a need to make use of complementary 
instruments. Under laws established in the 'pre-Apertura' period, guarantee 
prices for some products have been set for short periods in order to "... 
avoid decreases in farmers' income" (Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock; 
Resoluci6n 09040, November 1991); similarly, price adjustment factors 
intended to increase farmer's prices have been employed temporarily. In 
addition, as a permanent measure, IDEMA's role as a buyer has been 
reactivated but restricted to poor marginal areas. 
After two and a half years of functioning, Reyes and Ramirez (1993) 
performed an evaluation of the price band mechanism in which attention 
was given to its effects on price stabilization, protection of domestic 
production, and farmers' income, as well as to possible methodological 
problems. The authors arrived at the conclusion that there is a bias in the 
mechanism, noting the persistent tendency of the official reference price to 
­
be below the floor price. Therefore, for the period under analysis the price 
bands have favored protectionism. However, the variable tariff was quite 
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important in achieving price stability while movements in the exchange 
rate registered a modest, or even negative, role for this purpose. 
In the same way that price bands have had an stabilization effect on 
domestic prices, they have contributed to stabilizing farmers' prices. Reyes 
and Ramirez found a stabilization effect for all products, except soybean. 
Finally, the authors analyze the effects of price bands on income and 
welfare. In all cases, benefits to farmers derived from resource transfers were 
much bigger than those arising from risk diminution4 (in the case of 
soybean the latter is even negative). The benefits from transfers are large for 
corn producers, medium for rice, barley, and milk, and small for sugar, 
sorghum, soybean, and wheat. 
The overall conclusion from Reyes and Ramirez' analysis is that the price 
band mechanism has been beneficial for producers, but it has acted very 
much as a protectionist rather than a stabilization mechanism. Indeed, they 
found that the level of protection under this measure is bigger than with 
fixed ad-valorem tariffs and that in some cases the products included do not 
have highly variable international prices. 
1.1.5 Final Comments 
In 1992 the agricultural sector in Colombia showed clear recessive 
symptoms that motivated strong pressure from farmers on the 
-

4 Positive values associated with transfers of resources indicate net gains in 
farmers' income at the expense either of consumers or taxpayers and 
positive values associated with gains in efficiency (risk diminution) indicate 
benefits for farmers stemming from price stabilization. 
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government. As a result, a series of political measures were adopted to 
alleviate the ongoing crisis. Among them is the transient modification of 
part of the conditions that ruled agricultural credit for loans already given to 
farmers in some subsectors, the modification of the price band mechanism 
for substitutive and derivative products and byproducts, the establishment 
of guarantee prices for some products, and the reactivation and 
strengthening of the role of IDEMA as a buyer of commercial crops. 
Even though the 'Apertura' process was blamed as the cause of this crisis, 
some authors have shown that it was not the real source (Montenegro, 
1993). Indeed, as follows from the analysis done by Reyes and Ramirez (1993) 
on the price band mechanism, it is difficult to argue that the 'Apertura' 
process caused the crisis; on the contrary, the price band mechanism acted 
very much as a protectionist device, a little as a stabilization measure, and 
not at all as a non-protectionist policy. According to Montenegro (1993), the 
main roots of the agricultural crisis of 1992 stemmed from an unfortunate 
coincidence of factors that had a generalized decline of international prices 
and a severe drought as key factors. Nonetheless, Montenegro concedes that 
other factors (such as the appreciation of the exchange rate, the decrease in 
import tariffs for some products, rural violence, and the crisis of the 
Colombian Agricultural Bank) played a considerable role in the advent of 
this crisis. 
It appears that in spite of the controversy that arose around the impact of 
the 'Apertura' process on the agricultural sector, the period since its 
implementation is still too short to allow a complete evaluation of its 
effects. Major institutional changes like the decentralization of the 
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extension service and the 'semi-privatization' of the agricultural research 
system have yet to show what kind of effect they will have on the 
development of the sector. Also, the impact of the 'Apertura' on other 
variables will exert important indirect influences on the agricultural sector; 
particularly the behavior of employment and income - as well as income 
distribution - is expected to affect the sector principally through the demand 
for food. Basic data on Colombian agricultural production, imports, and 
exports are provided in Table 1.2 below. 
Table 1.2 Colombian Basic Agricultural Data (1989-1993) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sectorial GDP1 6,699.7 7,087.6 6,990.4 7,773.3 8,652.2 
Production index2 126.8 136.1 139.8 140.7 142.8 
Per-eap. Prod/no index2 106.0 111.8 112.9 111.7 111.5 
Agricultural imports3 338.7 392.5 314.8 637.8 747.5 
Agricultural exports3 2,411.7 2,494.6 2,695.7 2,658.7 2,516.3 
1 Source: The World Bank (figures in $ Million) 
2 Source: FAO's AGROSTAT (1979-81=100) 
3 Source: United Nations (figures in $ Million) 
One of the most interesting questions is whether or not the 'campesino' 
(peasant) sector will be able to maintain its growth and to what extent the 
restructuring of the research system will affect it. A complementary 
question about the options for the campesino sector to overcome marketing 
difficulties is likely to be a major preoccupation. The puzzle for large-scale 
­
agriculture is how to improve its efficiency to compete with foreign 
products. It is possible that the example of sugar cane, coffee, flowers, and 
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banana can be illustrative. In these cases farmers have devoted a 
considerable amount of capital to develop and operate research and 
extension units which produce or adapt new varieties of plants and transfer 
not only these new varieties but also new and more adequate farming 
practices improving the efficiency of their economic activity. 
Undoubtedly, the proposed government plan for improving basic 
infrastructure has an important role in the outcome for the agricultural 
sector. Road construction, port modernization, refrigerated storage facilities, 
and communications are some of the services required by the agricultural 
sector to achieve the competitiveness that is needed for its full 
development. It is also clear that an adequate exposure of the sector to 
external competition is necessary to promote the desired transformations 
and that some fine tuning (if not substantial changes) must be accomplished 
in sectorial policy. 
1.2 Mexican Agricultural Policy 
1.2.1 The Opening Up of the Mexican Economy 
Oil dependence and cyclical fiscal deficits created the conditions for a series 
of 'stabilization crises' that have characterized the Mexican economy, 
especially during the 1970s and 1980s. In response to one of these crises 
President de la Madrid (1983-1988) implemented a new stabilization 
program with the IMF in 1983. 
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Even though the economy showed signs of recovery under the new 
program, the fiscal deficit fell only marginally due to the fact that interest 
payments rose more than government spending decreased. As a 
consequence, inflation soared - reaching 159 percent in December 1987 
(Kalter, 1992, p. 5). In the middle of an electoral year, the government 
resorted to "... a series of closed-door negotiations with representatives of 
major economic interests ..." (Joint Economic Commission, 1988; p.24). The 
goal of these negotiations was to break the political opposition and to work 
out a way of satisfying both demands of fairness regarding austerity and the 
goal of increasing economic efficiency. The result of these meetings, held 
during the final year of the de la Madrid administration, was a broad social 
agreement named the Pacto de Solidaridad Econ6mica, popularly known as 
the Pacto. 
Among other reforms, the Pacto pushed for an acceleration of trade 
liberalization of the economy5. The signing of a "framework agreement' on 
trade with the United States contemporary with the negotiation of the Pacto 
acted as a catalyst for increased liberalization. According to a study of the 
Joint Economic Commission, the process of trade liberalization led Mexico 
"... from a complex system of 16 different tariff schedules with rates as high 
as 100 percent to a single schedule with a maximum rate of 20 percent." 
(1988, p. 28). From the issuing of the Pacto, the Mexican government relied 
more heavily on the management of the exchange rate as a means for 
controlling the flow of imports and avoiding further deterioration of the 
­
5 Mexico started liberalizing the economy in 1983, reducing tariffs and 
quantitative restrictions, and decided to join the GATT in 1986 during the 
implementation of the third stabilization package witht the IMF. 
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trade balance. This mechanism replaced to a great extent the use of 
quantitative restrictions which were eliminated completely on 95 percent of 
all tariff items, representing about 75 percent of import value. 
The economic policy under the Salinas administration (1989-1994) followed 
the path signaled by the Pacto, but tried to extend its economic scope in 
order to foster improved conditions for sustained growth. The Salinas 
program essentially intensified the policies initiated in 1986. In this regard, 
measures were undertaken to liberalize its international trade and 
investment systems, to liberalize and privatize the financial system, and to 
deregulate specific economic activities. 
During the Salinas administration the liberalization of international trade 
beyond the point reached at the end of 1988 was minor in reference to 
quantitative restrictions, tariffs, import reference prices, and export 
promotion6. To narrow the range of applied tariffs, in 1989 the minimum 
tariff was raised from 5 to 10 percent and the established tariff structure was 
maintained. Also, the elimination of remaining official import prices was 
continued and efforts to develop non-oil exports were increased (In 1989 a 
joint commission for the promotion of non-oil exports was established with 
participation of the public and private sectors - Szymczak, 1992, p. 30). 
However, very important steps were taken in securing the effective 
application of these changes. A comprehensive free trade agreement was 
negotiated and implemented with the United States and Canada (NAFTA) 
-

6 Quantitative restrictions affecting automobiles were modified at the end of 
1989 and by 1990 less than 15 percent of imported items were subject to 
licensing requirements (mainly agricultural and agroindustrial products as 
well as petroleum and derivatives). 
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while similar agreements were negotiated with a number of Latin 
American countries. 
Government efforts to liberalize foreign investment were also very 
important during the Salinas administration. The goal was to reach 5 billion 
dollars a year in foreign investment during the early 1990s, more than 
doubling the figures for the 1980s. However, at the end of the Salinas 
administration it was clear that none of the policies aimed at insulating the 
Mexican economy from external shocks was strong enough to prevent a 
new economic crisis. Trying to overcome the cycle of low economic growth, 
the government shifted aggregate demand policy, increasing governmental 
spending and allowing the financial sector to maintain lower levels of 
reserves. 
A series of speculative attacks against the peso forced the government to 
gradually resort to stricter measures to avoid an exchange crisis. From mid­
1992 to September 1993, tight monetary policy combined with high interest 
rates were employed to keep the exchange rate stabilized; however, these 
measures were insufficient to control the situation and between September 
1993 and March 1994 it was necessary to devalue the peso while maintaining 
high interest rates and increasing public debt through dollar-indexed bonds 
(Tesobonos). The increase in international interest rates in February 1994 
worsened the situation and the Mexican government pushed the interest 
rate up further and resorted to limited sales of international reserves 
-

between April and August. Finally, from September to December 1994 
(during the transition period between the Salinas and Zedillo 
administrations) massive sales of international reserves were necessary and 
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the peso plummeted further causing a deterioration in the current account? 
(Thorne, 1995). 
1.2.2 State Intervention in the Agricultural Sector 
As in other countries, state intervention in the Mexican agricultural sector 
has been extensive. During the 1930s, under the government of Lazaro 
Cardenas, large amounts of land were allocated land to the ejido system. 
Starting in the 1940s and continuing to the mid-1960s, significant public 
investment was made in rural infrastructure (from dams and irrigation 
systems to roads and electrification projects) and a positive climate was 
created for private sector large-scale commercial agriculture. New lands 
were opened to agricultural production, particularly in the north and 
northwestern regions, while high-yielding crop varieties were introduced 
and technologies associated with irrigation production were promoted. 
While there was practically no deconcentration of land ownership in the 
southern part of the country, this period, corresponding to the 'green 
revolution', perpetuated the bimodal pattern that characterizes Mexican 
agriculture. 
Simultaneously, a broad set of parastatal enterprises was created to attend to 
the needs of a growing agricultural sector that between 1940 and 1960 
increased its output at an annual rate of 6.3 percent (Martin, 1993; p.14). In 
the early 1950s the Mexican Import and Export Company - CEIMSA - was 
-

7 According to Mariscal (1995), short term public debt in dollar-indexed 
Tesobonos accounted for 6% of this type of debt in December 1983, 87% in 
December 1994, and 69% in February 1995. 
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created to act as the official domestic buyer and importer/exporter of 
agricultural products. Official guarantee prices were established in 1953 to 
help avoid price fluctuations and to stimulate production through periodic 
adjustments. In 1961, CEIMSA was restructured and changed its name to 
Compafiia Nacional de Subsistencias Populares - CONASUPO. As a result of 
its restructuring, the firm broadened its activities, expanding the coverage of 
the product collection system, buying or creating a series of food processing 
industries, and enlarging its chain of retail stores to final consumers ­
DICONSA. 
Also during this period the agricultural credit system was reinforced 
through the creation of several regional programs and the encouragement 
of private loans to the sector. Around the mid-1960s, 68 percent of the 
agricultural credit was provided by the private financial sector (Appendini, 
1992b). In addition, other related institutions were created to support 
Mexican agricultural development supplying subsidized inputs. For 
example, seeds production and distribution was provided through 
PRONASE, the production of chemical fertilizers was nationalized and 
FERTIMEX became a statal monopoly, the production of insecticides was 
reorganized, and other inputs such as electricity, diesel and gasoline, and 
water were subsidized. 
The modern sector was responsible for the biggest part of sectorial output 
increase. The convergence of high support prices and subsidies boosted 
­
production from 'entrepreneurial' farmers while the incorporation of new 
land into the 'traditional' sector made possible an increase in its production. 
However, at the end of the 1960s Mexican agricultural output decreased as a 
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consequence of the drop in the profitability of basic products and the lack of 
responsiveness of the 'traditional' sector (Appendini, 1992b; p. 53). As a 
result, in the early 1970s Mexico became a major importer of basic foodstuffs 
(Burbach and Rosset, 1994; p. 5). 
At the beginning of the 1970s, under the integrated rural development 
program - PillER, the Mexican government initiated a new wave of public 
spending in the agricultural sector. Small and medium-scale irrigation 
projects were accomplished, the distribution of inputs and the collection of 
products were improved through the strength~ning of CONASUPO's rural 
warehouses (BORUCONSA and ANDSA), and the credit system was 
restructured in 1976 with the creation of the Mexican Rural Bank ­
BANRURAL. In spite of these efforts, agricultural output growth lagged 
behind population growth and at the end of the 1970s the food deficit was 
huge8. 
The last attempt of the Mexican government to introduce dynamism into 
the agricultural sector through public spending was made between 1980 and 
1982 during the oil boom. Agricultural public spending increased more than 
15 percent between 1980 and 1982, sectorial investment grew nearly 9 
percent annually, guarantee prices rose, and governmental subsidies were 
kept at high levels - preferential interest rates were 82.5 percent less than 
commercial rates, the price of fertilizers was 30 percent below market prices, 
and seed prices were 70 percent less than free market prices (Appendini, 
­
8 It has been calculated that had food imports continued increasing at the 
rate of the late 1970s, by 1990 about 72 percent of total Mexican oil revenues 
would have had to be devoted to food imports (Martin, 1993; p. 38). 
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1992b; p. 73). While agricultural output soared, so did public spending. 
However, the Mexican Food System - SAM - was short-lived; the decline in 
oil prices and the financial crisis declared in August 1982 obligated the 
government to practically discard the program and the goal of self­
sufficiency. 
During the period of orthodox adjustment (1982-1987) the contraction of the 
economy did not affect drastically the agricultural sector and therefore the 
consequences of the crisis were not felt until the end of 1986. Even though a 
strict policy of austerity was implemented and public agricultural spending 
was restricted, slight increases in guarantee prices and the maintenance of 
agricultural subsidies together with the positive effects of periodic currency 
devaluation and favorable weather, helped the sector to alleviate the early 
effects of the crisis. This was a period during which the fruits and vegetables 
sector experienced remarkable growth that, even though not matched by 
high international prices, was significant in increasing its importance 
within the agricultural sector and the Mexican export sector in general. 
It has been pointed out by Appendini (1992b), that agricultural policy during 
the first half of the de la Madrid administration was hesitant and to a great 
extent it was reduced to budget restrictions. However, starting in 1986 and 
coinciding with negotiations held with the World Bank around the 
assignment of a series of loans for the agricultural sector, some measures 
were initiated pointing towards the restructuring of Mexican agriculture. 
­
25
 
1.2.3 The Agricultural Reform 
One of the few points around which there is broad consensus among 
analysts of the Mexican agricultural sector was the need to reduce and 
rationalize public agricultural expending. Decades of intense governmental 
intervention in the agricultural sector did not suffice to make Mexican 
agricultural policy successful - the fiscal cost of these policies was also high: 
in 1985 FERTIMEX received fiscal transfers equivalent to 0.3 percent of GDP 
(Appendini, 1992b). 
Consequently, in 1987 Mexican agricultural policy changed and a period of 
significant reform for this sector was initiated. Until this year, sectorial 
policy, especially food policy, was dominated by a short-term vision 
determined to a great extent by anti-inflationary measures within the 
framework of adjustment policies. The new agricultural policy, conversely, 
was more integrated with the macroeconomic program and more aggressive 
in introducing changes into the rural area. The confluence of the 
macroeconomic adjustment and stabilization program, the economic 
restructuring process, and the aim of economic liberalization generated the 
need for such an integration. 
At the end of 1988, the share of agricultural imports that required prior 
licenses was reduced from 85 percent in 1985 to 53 percent. Simultaneously, 
the elimination of licensing requirements and the reduction of import 
-

tariffs for agricultural inputs was performed at a faster pace in order to 
benefit domestic production. Price increases were. implemented initially 
covering diesel, gasoline, electricity, and water, and seeds and fertilizers later 
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on. Increases in guarantee prices for agricultural outputs were allowed at 
smaller levels than prices for the corresponding inputs and therefore 
profitability dropped. The gap between the preferential interest rate for the 
agricultural sector and the commercial interest rate was diminished, driving 
this subsidy from 0.51 percent of GDP in 1986 to 0.13 percent in 1988. Public 
spending in agriculture fell from 8.21 percent of total programmable 
spending in 1986 to 5.39 percent in 1988, contracting the execution of 
sectorial programs like irrigation, extension, and research. Even though 
diminished, the Mexican agricultural and food support budget amounted to 
3.1 billion dollars in 1988 (Cook, 1993; p. 900-4). 
Besides the introduction of these changes in Mexican agricultural policy, the 
shift from an orthodox to a heterodox macroeconomic adjustment policy 
(signaled by the issuing of the Pacto), implied a significant modification in 
the management of the exchange rate. The peso, which had been devalued 
periodically within the orthodox approach (favoring Mexican agricultural 
exports and discouraging imports), was subjected to a new regime of slow 
controlled devaluation that was programmed to be about 8 percent annually 
during the first three years of the Pacto. This fact, along with the presence of 
higher interest rates in Mexico than in the U.s. and the existence of 
preferential credit for Mexico in the U.s. market to buy its agricultural 
products, generated strong anti-export forces that helped to depress domestic 
production. As a consequence, sectorial GDP experienced negative growth 
rates during 1987-1988 (Appendini, 1992b). 
-
•. 
These changes, however, constituted only the beginning of the 'revolution' 
experienced by the Mexican agricultural sector from 1989, during the 
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presidency of Carlos Salinas. The agricultural reform undertaken during the 
Salinas administration could be characterized as an effort to modernize and 
dynamize the agricultural sector by means of opening it up to market forces. 
In 1989, a series of major institutional changes were carried out by the 
government, beginning the process of deregulation and privatization of the 
agricultural sector. Credit policy was modified and BANRURAL decided not 
to give new loans to farmers that had not restructured their outstanding 
loans. As a consequence, around 70 percent of its clients lost access to 
financial support. Even though this policy was eventually made flexible, as 
of August 1990 22 percent of the arable land that usually received credit 
from BANRURAL continued to be excluded from it. Additionally, 
commercial farmers began to be serviced only through private banks. An 
important change in production policy was also accomplished. Government 
support was segmented and the bulk was targeted towards farmers 
considered to have the potential to improve their efficiency. A series of 
Regional Promotional Plans were developed and only the specific areas and 
crops that matched the criteria established under each of these plans were 
allowed governmental productive support. (Appendini, 1992a, 1992b; 
Hewitt, 1992; Myhre, 1995; Garda, 1995) 
The role of CONASUPO was redefined so that its marketing activities were 
restricted to corn and beans and its former monopoly on agricultural 
imports was abolished. In order to strengthen the presence of this agency in 
ejido areas, the Marketing Support Program for Ejido Areas (PACE) was ­
,. 
broadened and the location and number of BORUCONSA's (CONASUPO's 
points of purchase) warehouses were modified. Consistently with the 
segmentation of governmental agricultural support services, the National 
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Program of Solidarity (PRONASOL) was launched with the purpose of 
bringing social assistance to farmers without the potential to improve their 
productive efficiency. (Appendini, 1992a, 1992b; Hewitt, 1992; Myhre, 1995; 
Garda, 1995) 
Other additional measures were also implemented during 1989. The 
National Agricultural and Livestock Insurance Company (ANAGSA) was 
eliminated and was later replaced with a new firm (AGROSEMEX). The 
retirement of CONASUPO from the marketing of the majority of 
agricultural products was compensated with the creation of ASERCA which 
performs the function of an agricultural product exchange market, seeking 
both a more 'transparent' and efficient process of price determination. 
FERTIMEX's manufacturing plants were privatized and the firm was 
redefined solely as a marketing business. At the end of 1989, the budget 
allocated to the Mexican Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, and Water 
Resources (SARH) had decreased 70 percent in real terms as compared with 
that of 1983. Finally, the flexibility allowed for imports of agricultural 
products was further increased and hence the degree of foreign competition 
within domestic markets was enhanced. (Appendini, 1992a, 1992b; Hewitt, 
1992; Myhre, 1995; Garda, 1995) 
Following the institutional shock of 1989, the transformation of the 
agricultural sector was formalized through the launching of the National 
Program for the Modernization of the Rural Area 1990-1994. After the first 
­
year of this program, the average import tariff for agricultural products was 
5 percent and among the main domestically produced goods only maize, 
beans, and wheat continued to be under licensing requirements (Appendini, 
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1992b; p. 104). In addition, imports of agricultural inputs were completely 
liberalized and guarantee prices (with the exception of maize and beans) and 
subsidized interest rates were abolished. The production of maize and beans 
in 'promising' rain-fed areas also became eligible for attention under the 
Regional Promotional Plans system. 
Three major policy tools were introduced in Mexico after the launching of 
the Program for the Modernization of the Rural Area. First, the 
modification of the land ownership regime in January 1992; second, the 
signing of NAFTA in December 1992; and, third, the establishment of the 
Program for Direct Support to Rural Areas (PROCAMPO). 
The change of the land ownership system implied the modification of the 
Mexican constitution. The objectives of this change are ambitious: it 
attempts to create a market for land in Mexico and to remove institutional 
rigidities that were presumed to be blocking private investment. The new 
regime 'individualized' land ownership and gave legal title to land to ejido 
farmers who now can sell or use it as collateral for their loans. This also 
allowed foreigners to buy land in Mexico (up to the limits established for 
private nationals in the modified article 27 of the Mexican constitution), 
and authorized land ownership by corporations (previously prohibited) 
limiting their landholdings to 2,500 hectares. 
In 1989, Mexico and the United States conducted talks about the definition 
-
of a framework for broadening bilateral trade and investment relations that, 
.­
in 1990, was extended to cover standards, regulations, testing, and 
certification issues (USDA, 1992; p. 1). In June 1990 President Salinas asked 
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President Bush to consider the establishment of a free trade area (FTA) 
between the two countries. Since Canada already had an FTA with the U.S., 
it decided to join the set of conversations that, after about two years, 
culminated with the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA). The coverage of NAFTA regulations is broad, comprising areas 
in which other international treaties have made only limited advances such 
as property rights, the environment, and labor issues. Its importance for the 
Mexican economy as a whole cannot be overstated and its impact on the 
Mexican agricultural sector, in particular, is expected to be a major 
determinant in shaping its future as it allows open competition with the 
U.S.' agricultural sector. 
Among the striking challenges faced by the Mexican agricultural sector is 
the effective and efficient conversion of its productive activities. The 
Mexican government has attempted to decouple farmer support from 
production decision-making, hence freeing the introduction of new crops by 
means of a system of financial transfers to farmers. Instead of making these 
transfers conditional upon the newly planned crops, the new system is 
based on historical average acreages planted in some crops and on fixed 
average yields. Established in October 1993, this Program for Direct Support 
to Rural Areas (PROCAMPO) is intended to benefit about 70 percent of total 
cultivated area and will make constant payments, in real terms, to farmers 
during a ten year span after which it will be phased out within five more 
years (Valdes, 1994; p. 29). Basic data on Mexican agricultural production, 
-

imports, and exports are presented in Table 1.3. 
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Table 1.3 Mexican Basic Agricultural Data (1989-1993) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sectorial GDP1 18,065.7 25,427.3 21,397.5 26,320.9 27,477.8 
Production index2 104.9 115.6 118.9 117.2 121.1 
Per-eap. Prod/no index2 85.1 91.8 92.5 89.2 90.2 
Agricultural imports3 3,534.9 4,268.0 4,046.1 5,353.6 5,205.2 
Agricultural exports3 2,726.0 2,996.6 3,224.5 2,895.6 3,549.2 
1 Source: The World Bank (figures in $ Million) 
2 Source: FAO's AGROSTAT (1979-81=100) 
3 Source: United Nations (figures in $ Million) 
1.2.4. The NAFTA and the Agricultural Sector 
As was mentioned, NAFTA regulates the phased elimination of most trade 
barriers (tariff and non-tariff barriers) on trilateral trade among Mexico the 
U.S. and Canada. The accord includes trade and investment provisions and 
is the first case of an FTA linking developed and developing economies. 
According to Hufbauer and Schott (1993), "[t]he accord immediately converts 
key US and Mexican agricultural restrictions into tariff-rate quotas and sets a 
maximum IS-year period for the phase out of the over-quota tariffs -an 
impressive achievement considering the dismal track record of other talks 
in reducing long-standing farm trade barriers." (p. 2) A particular feature of 
NAPTA's agricultural provisions is that they are the only case in which the 
agreement does not involve the three signing countries; instead, two 
separate bilateral accords were negotiated between Mexico and the U.S. and ­
Mexico and Canada, while agricultural trade among the U.S. and Canada 
continues to be ruled by their previous PTA. Nonetheless, provisions on 
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rules of origin, safeguards, and sanitary and phytosanitary standards are 
common to the three countries. 
NAFTA's agricultural bargaining process concentrated on the mutual 
elimination of trade and non-trade barriers to trade between Mexico and the 
U.S., particularly in regard to Mexico's liberalization of its import regime for 
basic crops (especially grains) and the U.S. opening up for imports of sub­
tropical fruits and horticultural products from Mexico. The agreement 
established five different schedules for trade liberalization ranging from 
immediate tariff elimination to tariff-rate quotas complemented by a fifteen 
year phase out period for tariffs (Hufbauer and Schott, 1993). 
The three countries have issued lists of products to which a special 
safeguard mechanism, in the form of TRQs (different from those 
mentioned above), can be imposed within the 10 year transition period if 
considered necessary to protect domestic production. In the case of the U.S. 
the list includes seasonal vegetables and fresh watermelons and in the case 
of Mexico it includes swine, certain potatoes, and fresh apples. Similarly, a 
'snapback' in imposed tariffs to the pre-NAFfA level (or the Most Favored 
Nation level if lower) is allowed for a period up to 3 years (or 4 in the case of 
the most import-sensitive products), if the surge of imports from a NAFTA 
partner threatens to cause substantial damage to domestic producers. These 
safeguard mechanisms cannot be applied simultaneously to the same 
product. 
­
As was mentioned, NAFTA also determines common sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures and establishes strict rules of origin. For example, a 
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processed farm product, in general, can only be classified as of North 
American origin if at most up to 7 percent of its transaction value is of non­
NAFTA origin (for tobacco this value is 9 percent and for fruit juices 0). 
1.2.5 The Provisional Outcome of NAFTA 
There seems to be a loose consensus among analysts that the future of 
Mexican agriculture under NAFTA is not very bright. While agricultural 
liberalization makes the realization of important efficiency gains for the 
Mexican economy possible (Levy and van Wijnbergen, 1992), these gains 
may entail a huge social cost. Appropriate mechanisms are needed to assure 
the mobility of resources from the agricultural sector to other sectors of the 
economy (Martin, 1993) and the dynamics of economic growth need to 
provide for the productive absorption of these resources. 
Ex-ante evaluations of the impact of NAFTA on Mexico-U.S. agricultural 
trade flows indicated that U. S. exports to Mexico would increase faster than 
Mexican exports to the U.S., hence reinforcing the trend initiated from 
recent years towards net Mexican deficits in agricultural trade vis a vis the 
U.S. In fact, after having a 2 percent trade surplus in 1990, Mexico has 
registered considerable deficits in the following years - 19 percent in 1991,60 
percent in 1992, and 33 percent in 1993 (USDA, 1994; p. 7). An evaluation of 
bilateral agricultural trade flows after one year of operation of NAFTA, 
performed by the USDA's NAFTA Economic Monitoring Task Force (1995), 
-

shows that U.S. agricultural exports to Mexico increased 25.3 percent with 
respect to 1993 and that Mexican exports increased 5.4 percent, further 
deteriorating the Mexican agricultural trade balance. Table 1.4 details the 
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behavior of bilateral agricultural trade in 1994 with respect to the year 
before. 
Table 1.4	 Percentage Changes in Bilateral Agricultural Trade Between 
Mexico and the U.S. After One Year of Operation of the NAFfA 
with Respect to the Year Before 
U.S. Total Exports to Mexico 
Animals and animal products 
Grains and feeds 
Fruits and prepars., except juice 
Fruit juices, including frozen 
Nuts and preparations 
Vegetables and preparations 
Oilseeds and products 
Other 
U.S. Total Imports from Mexico 
Bananas and plantains 
Coffee, including products 
Animals and animal products 
Live cattle 
Grains, products, and feeds 
Fruits and preparations 
Fruit juices, including frozen 
Vegetables and preparations 
Tomatoes 
Sugar and related products 
Beverages, except fruit juices 
Cotton linters 
Seeds - field and garden 
Cut flowers 
Nursery stock, bulbs, etc. 
Other 
$ Million 
4,513
 
1,359
 
1,223
 
185
 
11
 
44
 
263
 
851
 
580
 
2,855
 
59
 
333
 
385
 
352
 
85
 
358
 
58
 
1,125
 
315
 
51
 
198
 
14
 
7
 
13
 
8
 
163
 
Change 
25.3 
15.8 
38.2 
66.6 
97.9 
18.0 
42.4 
29.8 
5.0 
5.4 
-37.9 
32.5 
-16.0 
-18.1 
41.0 
14.0 
89.5 
6.3 
3.7 
81.7 
6.6 
17.9 
-21.2 
11.2 
11.0 
337.8 
-

Source: USDA's NAFfA Economic Monitoring Task Force (1995) 
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In determining the future of Mexican agricultural sector, the evolution of 
the domestic market is a major question. If its growth is high enough to 
boost the demand for agricultural products, it could provide the main 
source for sectorial growth, depending on the composition of the demand. 
The modern agricultural sector will become more integrated into a North 
American food system, characterized by highly competitive requirements 
and a permanent need for technological change and integrative schemes. 
Unless well directed policies and public investment are put into practice, 
this situation is likely to increase the technological and economic gap 
between the production of tradables and non-tradables and to exacerbate the 
characteristic "dualism" of the Mexican agricultural sector and the 
likelihood of increased rural to urban or international migration. This is so 
because of the relatively poor natural resource endowment that 
characterizes the Mexican agricultural sector and limits the possibility that 
traditional agriculture, lacking financial resources, can modernize without 
government intervention (Paarlberg, 1993; Cook, 1993; Levy and van 
Wijnbergen, 1992; OTA, 1992). 
Dynamic gains from liberalization accruing to the agricultural sector are 
expected to be relatively limited. They depend almost exclusively on the 
potential of the sector to attract further investment, which is considered to 
be constrained by a variety of factors such as the relatively poor natural 
resource endowments of the country (especially land quality and water 
availability), the lack of clear-cut long term competitive advantage, and lack 
of infrastructure. On the other hand, the rapid de-regulation of the sector 
has created what has been called an 'institutional vacuum'. This threatens 
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not only the possibility of having a less disruptive transition period, both in 
the economic and social sense, but also the chance of modernizing and 
diversifying the traditional sector due to the absence of institutions (both at 
the government and community levels) that can carry out the needed 
transformation. 
In such a context, the perspective for further economic integration of the 
Mexican agricultural sector with those of other Latin American countries is 
unclear. From the political point of view, it is unlikely that the Mexican 
government would be willing to add more trouble to the already 
complicated social situation in Mexican rural areas. From the economic 
point of view, it may be in the Mexican interest to have other suppliers of 
agricultural products competing on an equal basis with U.S. exports. 
However, new competitors also bring new dangers. Free trade with other 
Latin American countries creates competition for Mexican tropical products 
for the internal market and the consequences of this competition should be 
carefully considered before extending the scope of free trade. 
1.3 Venezuelan Agricultural Policy 
During the 1920s oil replaced agricultural goods as the main Venezuelan 
export. Since then, oil earnings have been the major source of fiscal 
revenues and have financed the modernization of the economy. The 
increased importance of oil and the overvalued exchange rate arising from 
-

the oil boom provided the economic basis for ending the power of the old 
landowners class. A land reform was launched between 1946 and 1948 and 
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was followed by several other attempts that, however, were unable to 
effectively deconcentrate land ownership (Nissen and Welsch, 1994). 
The dynamics of the Venezuelan macroeconomic situation are, in essence, 
similar to those of other Latin American countries. In Dornbusch's analysis 
(1990), the presence of relatively inconsistent goals is responsible for 
periodic crisis. If the economy has external equilibrium and high wages, 
unemployment is high. If the economy is competitive enough to reach 
external equilibrium at full employment, real wages are low and generate 
social tension. If real wages and employment are high, external imbalances 
may be a serious problem if there is no way to finance them. Dornbusch 
considers that Latin America remained in the last situation during most of 
the 1970s and that the crisis of the 1980s was due to both lack of external 
finance sources and negative external shocks. What is particularly 
important (but not exclusive) in the Venezuelan case, though, is the 
development of a widespread rent-seeking behavior in the context of a 
highly protected economy. As Nissen and Welsch (1994) point out, "[t]he 
existence of the oil rent itself and the need to distribute it created a 
widespread rent-seeking mentality rather than an entrepreneurial 
orientation towards production" (p.94). Besides, as oil revenues made the 
bolivar a strong currency, the only way to sustain the lSI strategy was by 
means of high tariff protection and import quotas that reinforced the lack of 
competitiveness of domestic industry. This made it very difficult to 
diversify the Venezuelan export basis. 
­
A series of external shocks have marked the development of the 
Venezuelan economy. The oil boom of 1972-1974 led to a peak in the 
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investment rate of 42 percent of GDP. Public and private foreign borrowing 
became more important when oil revenues stagnated during 1977-1978 and 
were insufficient to finance the investment program. As a consequence, at 
the end of the 1970s, the Venezuelan economy had excess productive 
capacity, high external and fiscal deficits, and inflationary pressures that 
called for major economic adjustments. 
In the midst of the recession of 1979-1980 a new oil boom (bringing oil 
revenues from $8.8 billion to $18 billion per year - Nissen and Welsch, 1994) 
allowed Venezuela to register external and fiscal surpluses again, but it was 
unable to restore the dynamics of economic growth. A new decrease of oil 
revenues, starting in 1982, and the continuing capital flight pushed public 
foreign borrowing up and led to an international reserves crisis in 1983. 
Changes in fiscal spending, the exchange rate regime, and import 
restrictions (Hausmann, 1990) stabilized the economy at the end of 1985 and 
the government switched to a demand-led expansion policy with a three­
year investment program aimed at obtaining a minimum 3 percent growth. 
At this time, the economy was shaken by a third external shock. Oil prices 
plummeted in 1986 driving a $3.3 billion surplus in the current account to a 
$2.2 billion deficit. Notwithstanding the fact that the non-oil sector grew 6 
percent after almost a decade of stagnation, the economy was in a profound 
crisis. 
-
By 1989, the need to make radical changes in economic policy was evident. 
The basic lines of the new economic program were defined by a team of 
economists that belonged to a group composed by the Presidential 
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Commission for State Reform and a prestigious university (Instituto de 
Estudios Superiores de Administraci6n). The program was also discussed 
with representatives of the Roraima Group, an organization grouping the 
top of the private sector (Nissen and Welsch, 1994). The program, very 
much along the lines of the adjustment programs proposed by the World 
Bank and the IMF, included a series of policies aimed at the liberalization 
and deregulation of the economy. Among them were the elimination of 
price controls on goods and services (with the exception of some basic 
consumption goods), the abandonment of the multiple exchange rate 
system and its replacement by a single floating exchange rate, gradual but 
significant reductions in import tariffs, increases in prices and tariffs of 
publicly supplied goods and a tax reform aimed at reducing fiscal deficits, 
and liberalization of the interest rate to remove distortions in capital 
markets. 
The essential elements of the trade reform comprise the reduction of non­
tariff barriers (NTBs) to a maximum of 5 percent of domestic production 
(initially NTBs covered about 50 of the output of the manufacturing sector), 
the simplification of the tariff structure reducing the number of tariff 
categories from 40 to 5, the reduction of the maximum tariff level from 135 
percent to 20 percent, the elimination of state import monopolies, and the 
removal of restrictions on exports (with few exceptions applying to 
subsidized products). Restrictions on foreign direct investment were 
scheduled to be lifted and national treatment was granted to foreign 
investors, including the issuing of a limit on profit taxes of 30 percent. The 
reform has led also to membership to GATT and to' the establishment of a 
common external tariff with Colombia in 1992. 
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1.3.2 Agricultural Policy during the 1983 Economic Reform 
The economic reform of 1983 was intended to correct macroeconomic 
imbalances that were impinging upon the sustainability of Venezuelan 
economic growth. Even though the objective of this policy was not the 
reform of the economic structure, it had important effects on the 
agricultural sector via governmental spending and other supporting 
measures. At the end of 1983 the agricultural sector was in crisis; sectorial 
output and harvested area were declining and farmer confidence in sectorial 
institutions was at its lowest point due to the bankruptcy of the government 
owned agricultural marketing company (CMA), which was unable to pay 
farmers for their crops. 
Although the administration that took office in 1984 continued the austerity 
policy initiated in 1983, a production enhancement program was 
implemented for the agricultural sector. According to Gutierrez (1995), this 
program was based on the restoration of farmers' confidence in sectorial 
institutions, the restructuring and expansion of agricultural credit, 
protectionism for domestic production, and the improvement of sectorial 
profitability. To restore farmers' confidence, the government allocated 
funds to cover CMA's outstanding debts and restructured farmers' loans 
previously acquired, reducing interest rates and extending payment periods. 
Simultaneously, the credit policy covering new sectorial loans was 
-
modified, establishing a maximum interest rate of 8.5 percent (substantially ,­
below interest rates for other activities) and requiring the financial sector to 
allocate no less than 20 percent of its loans to the agricultural sector. It has 
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been estimated (Gutierrez, 1995) that public sectorial lending increased at 2.5 
percent annually while private lending grew at 8.6 percent, both in real 
terms, during the period 1984-1988. 
Agricultural trade policy during 1984-1988 was intended to give high 
protection levels to the agricultural sector while trying to reduce imports. 
Processed products that were highly competitive with domestic production 
or considered to be luxury goods, were ruled out for import (products under 
nota 1); this group comprised products such a apples, pears, pork, and 
poultry, among others (Bolling, 1988). Most basic commodities, such as 
wheat, feed grains, dried milk, sugar, oilseeds, and protein meals were 
under an import-quota system (nota 2) that allocated import licenses only 
after domestic production had been sold out. Additionally, imports of some 
products were required to obtain sanitary certificates from the Ministry of 
Health (nota 3), the Ministry of Agriculture (nota 6), or the country of origin 
(nota 5). 
Concessions made to the feed manufacturing industry also created 
distortions in the agricultural sector. A system of reference prices operated 
for this subsector in fixing the value of imported products. Since the early 
1980s, reference prices were below international prices so that feed 
manufacturers were directly subsidized. Intending to secure food supply, the 
Venezuelan government allocated preferential exchange rates for imports 
of basic commodities9 . This helped to boost the production of mixed feed 
for hogs, poultry, and dairy cattle (Bolling, 1988) as well as the production of .­
9 Within the multiple exchange rate regime. 
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bread and pasta from imported wheat, replacing traditional consumption of 
domestic white corn and rice in diets (Kennedy, 1994). 
According to Gutierrez (1995) there were no clear objectives or policy 
measures in relation to agricultural exports during this period. In general, 
they were discouraged both because of governmental concern about 
domestic food supply, which led sometimes to export prohibitions, and 
because of the exchange rate policy. Exporters of agricultural products did 
not have access to free market exchange rates and therefore could exchange 
their foreign receipts only at the official exchange rate which was 
increasingly above the former 10. In fact, Krissoff and Trapido (1991) ­
referenced in Gutierrez (1995) - consider that overvalued exchange rates 
were the most important macroeconomic policy in determining the 
behavior of the agricultural sector. Export subsidies were unable to avoid 
the decrease in agricultural exports during this period. 
The profitability of the agricultural sector was also favored through price 
policies, subsidies, and government spending. Fixed according to domestic 
production costs and well above international prices - according to Bolling 
(1988), a set of guarantee prices at the farm level were established for corn, 
sorghum, rice, beans, copra, peanuts, sesame, sunflower seed, bananas, 
plantains, garlic, potatoes, broilers, eggs, beef carcasses, pork, milk, cocoa, 
-
10 Until 1986, exporters were allowed to exchange foreign receipts at the free 
market exchange rate; as a consequence, agricultural exports grew from 125 
million dollars in 1983 to 251 million dollars in 1986. However, in 1987 they 
were restricted to the official exchange rate, that at· the time was about 50 
percent above the free market rate, and therefore agricultural exports 
dropped to 91 million dollars in 1988 (Gutierrez, 1995) 
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coffee, and cotton. After being reduced in 1983 due to budget cuts, subsidies 
were reestablished, rising from about 9 percent of the agricultural budget in 
1986 to 25 percent in 198811 (Gutierrez, 1992); in the case of fertilizers, 
subsidies ranged from about 50 to 90 percent of the market price (Bolling, 
1988; Gutierrez, 1992). Public spending was also increased during this period, 
growing at an annual rate of 9 percent in real terms. In allocating the 
sectorial budget, priority was given to irrigation projects, rural roads, 
agricultural research, and marketing facilities. Finally, imports of 
agricultural inputs and equipment were stimulated by assigning them 
allotments within the preferential exchange rate regime. These conditions 
favored private investment in the sector that, nevertheless, did not increase 
at the expected levels (real annual growth for this variable was 3.5 percent 
during this period). 
An extraordinarily dynamic agricultural growth resulted from these 
policies; sectorial output grew more than 6 percent per year between 1984 
and 1988, the increase being more remarkable in cases in which the country 
had been a net importer in recent years (corn, sugar cane, oil seeds, and 
others). Subsidies were particularly successful in stimulating poultry, pork, 
and milk production. Agricultural output growth, however, was obtained at 
a high public cost that made it unsustainable. As Bolling (1988) points out 
"[t]he government effort to control the economy through import and input 
subsidies and high farm price supports has been costly. Resources have been 
misallocated as Venezuela sought to create a temperate zone agriculture in a 
-

11 These measures were implemented after the government switched from 
a restrictive to an expansive macroeconomic policy as was mentioned in the 
previous section. 
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tropical zone climate" (p. 131-132). Indiscriminate import substitution, 
subsidies and other support policies, and high protection levels generated 
an agricultural sector lacking competitiveness; this situation indirectly 
discriminated against products in which Venezuela has comparative 
advantage such as rice, tropical fruits, roots and tubers, coffee, cocoa, 
plantains, and beef (Gutierrez, 1992, 1995). 
Increasing macroeconomic imbalances jointly with stagnating oil revenues 
resulted in the abandonment of the expansive economic policy and the 
introduction of a new economic adjustment program in 1989 that radically 
modified agricultural policy. 
1.3.3 Agricultural Policy under the 1989 Adjustment Program 
The 1989 adjustment program has had important effects on the agricultural 
sector through changes in fiscal, credit, exchange rate, and trade policies. 
Measures in these fields jointly with the objective of sectorial deregulation 
are changing the orientation of Venezuelan agriculture. Fiscal policy 
changes resulted in a considerable diminution in agricultural spending in 
1989 and even though it increased again in the following years its level in 
real terms has been below those in 1984-1988. Preferential interest rates were 
increased, the multiple exchange rate regime, which favored agricultural 
inputs and equipment imports, was eliminated, and trade protection was 
dramatically reduced. 
­
Attempting to foster sectorial competitiveness, reductions in agricultural 
spending were particularly severe for subsidies. General subsidies for food 
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and fixed prices, benefiting poor consumers, were almost completely 
eliminated and sometimes replaced by targeted direct subsidies. However, in 
June 1994, as a consequence of the financial crisis, emergency price controls 
were instituted for basic goods comprising rice, grains, flour, bread, pasta, 
fruits, vegetables, sugar and sweets, pork, beef, poultry, fish, eggs, milk, fats 
and oils, salt, chocolate, condiments, and non-alcoholic beverages (Kennedy, 
1994). Subsidies for most inputs and machinery were eliminated but remain 
in place for irrigation water (irrigation fees are just 1 to 2 percent of its costs), 
fertilizers (although reduced to 30 percent of its market price in 1991), and 
electricity (there is 24 percent discount for farmers' tariffs). Additionally, the 
agricultural sector is still exempted from income tax and the value added tax 
at the wholesale leveP 2 does not apply on domestically produced 
agricultural commodities (such as rice and sorghum) and on selected 
processed staples (including table rice, corn and wheat flour, bread and pasta, 
meat, eggs, canned sardines, and powdered milk) - Kennedy, 1994. 
Government-administered guarantee prices for rice, palm oil, sugar cane, 
and wheat were discontinued, while farm prices for fluid milk and 
processor-level prices for powdered milk remain unchanged. 
According to Gutierrez (1995), the huge devaluation introduced with the 
modification of the foreign exchange rate regime was not enough to 
completely compensate for underpricing of imports in domestic currency. 
As a consequence, the combined effects of this policy and those of trade 
liberalization, resulted in the decline of real prices for most agricultural 
,­
12 Issued in October 1993 and transformed into a new wholesale tax in July 
1994. 
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products. On the other hand, the bolivar devaluation increased import 
prices of inputs and equipment, impinging upon sectorial production costs. 
Agricultural credit policy reform was also significant in increasing 
production costs. Preferential interest rates for this sector were raised to a 
level equivalent to 85 percent of the commercial rate and the requirement 
for the financial sector of devoting a certain percentage of its portfolio to 
agriculture was diminished from 22.5 percent under the previous 
legislation to 12 percent in 1992 and then raised to 17.5 percent in 1993. With 
the disbanding of the governmentally-owned agricultural development 
bank (BANDAGRO), sectorial credit was mainly left in the hands of the 
private financial sector. This institutional reform was complemented by the 
restructuring of the agricultural credit fund (FCA), a state agency that 
supplies funds for agricultural credit to public and private banks, and of the 
agricultural credit institute (lCAP), that administered loans at subsidized 
interest rates (7 percent plus a 3 percent fee for technical services) for 
working capital and purchases of equipment by small farmers. As a result of 
these changes, availability of credit for the agricultural sector diminished 
and shortage of cash affected area planted as well as marketing of crops; 
private investment was also affected, falling 3.6 percent in real terms during 
1989-1992 with respect to the period 1984-1988 (Gutierrez, 1995). 
As part of the de-regulation process, the export monopolies that controlled 
trade of coffee (FONCAFE) and cocoa beans (FONCACAO) were eliminated 
-

as well as export controls on rice, legumes, and cornmeal. Similarly, the 
government sold most of its sugar mills and removed its marketing 
monopoly on this product; however, storage facilities continue under public 
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ownership. The reduction or elimination of subsidies and the de-regulation 
of agricultural markets are reflected in the diminution of the degree of 
support for agricultural commodities. Calculated as the ratio of public 
transfers to farmers to the production valuel3, the agricultural support 
index has tended to decline between 1986 and 1993. Table 1.5 presents the 
value of the support index for some products. 
Table 1.5	 Value of the Agricultural Support Index for Some Venezuelan 
Products 
Rice Corn Sorghum Sugar Milk 
1986 79.3 61.3 80.3 38.2 65.1 
1989 40.1 -15.8 43.9 -39.6 -13.1 
1991 11.6 1.5 21.1 16.3 42.3 
1993 10.4 10.1 20.0 -1.8 30.8 
Figures as a percentage of production value (data for corn are with respect to
 
hard red winter wheat prices).
 
Source: Gutierrez (1995)
 
Trade policy reform has been key in de-regulating agricultural markets and
 
removing	 distortions in resource allocation resulting from government
 
intervention. Initially programmed to begin in 1991, trade reform was
 
initiated by mid 1990 when the list of prohibited import products (nota 1)
 
-
13 Within the Andean Pact countries the agricultural support index is 
defined as the ratio of transfers to farmers (comprising the effect of sectorial 
or general policies on agricultural products' prices and on inputs' prices ­
including only fertilizers and short-term credit) to the output value. This 
index has been used in trying to harmonize agricultural policies. 
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was scheduled for complete elimination and a broad set of products was 
removed from the prior import license requirement (nota 2) - this measure 
comprised products such as fish, fruits, vegetables, roots and tubers, coffee, 
cocoa, and meat. In 1989, approximately 20 percent of primary products and 
30 percent of processed products were under nota 1 regulations; this 
proportions had been reduced to 5 and 25 percent in 1990 and to zero in 1991 
(Gutierrez, 1995). Analogously, 38 percent and 49 percent of primary and 
processed products were subject to nota 2 requirements in 1989, and these 
proportions were reduced to 32 and 25 percent in 1990 and to 9 and 19 
percent in 1991 (Gutierrez, 1995). Later on, in 1992, the rest of quantitative 
restrictions were abolished and after the harvest season corresponding to 
the second half of this year, imports of feed grains, soybeans, and soybean 
meal were unrestricted (Kennedy, 1994). 
On the other hand, tariff reductions were carried out to increase the degree 
of competition for the sector. Average import tariffs for primary products 
were diminished from 36 percent in 1989 to 22 percent in 1990 and to 12 
percent in 1991, while those applied to processed products declined from 58 
percent to 35 and to 23 percent, respectively (Gutierrez, 1995). In January 
1992, tariffs were further reduced to a maximum of 20 percent and as a 
safeguard mechanism the option was established of increasing them up to 
32 percent in cases in which imports pose a particular threat for domestic 
producers (Venezuela issued antidumping measures in 1992). This option 
has been used for feed grains, cheese, and orange juice on the grounds that 
-

imports of these products receive subsidies in their countries of origin. As a 
result of trade liberalization, at the end of 1993 nominal protection 
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coefficients had decreased as compared to those in 1986. The corresponding 
figures are shown in Table 1.6. 
Table 1.6 Nominal Protection Coefficients for Some Venezuelan Products 
Rice Corn Sorghum Sugar Milk 
1986 54.3 57.8 57.7 29.0 64.4 
1989 -2.1 2.5 17.3 -46.3 -16.2 
1991 5.8 0.4 11.9 13.5 41.9 
1993 -8.1 17.2 7.4 -7.5 26.8 
Source: Gutierrez (1995) 
By removing barriers to trade the government has not only increased 
competition in agricultural markets but has also strengthened linkages 
between domestic prices and international prices. However, considering 
that during a long period the Venezuelan agricultural sector did not face 
price risk (since price controls and subsidies were in place), a price band 
mechanism was implemented in order to ease the transition towards a price 
fluctuating market (Coleman and Larson, 1991). This price stabilization 
scheme was deemed particularly suited to isolating the domestic market 
from extreme fluctuations in international prices, given that it allows 
changes in international prices to be reflected in the market, is transparent 
and predictable, and does not pose a big financial burden on the 
government (Coleman and Larson, 1991). The system was established in 
-

1991, covering products such as animals feed, meat, cereals for human 
consumption, sugar, milk, and oilseeds and its derivatives. In 1993 it was 
modified to better protect domestic producers and to make it more 
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compatible with the common external tariff of the Andean Pact and with 
the Andean Pact's price band mechanism. 
A broad array of public investment programs was issued to complement 
and support the process of de-regulation of the agricultural sector. The 
Venezuelan government has sought to improve and promote better use of 
the existing productive infrastructure (irrigation systems, rural roads, and 
land improvement), to enlarge and rationalize the commercial infras­
tructure, and to encourage and support agricultural research (Gutierrez, 
1992). This has been attempted through both comprehensive legislation 
regulating the development of the agricultural sector (Ley Organica para la 
Agricultura) and a more specific plan for sectorial investment, financed by 
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (Programa de 
Inversiones para la Transformaci6n del Sector Agropecuario - PITSA). 
Unfortunately, the PITSA, planned as a billion dollar program, has not 
completely gone into effect; as of 1993, disbursements made by the World 
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank were less than 50 million 
dollars (Gutierrez, 1995). 
The adjustment of the agricultural sector within the 1989 Venezuelan 
economic program has been difficult. Planted area has decreased since 1989; 
after a peak of near 3 million hectares in 1988, it diminished to 2 million 
hectares in 1989 and to 1.5 million hectares in 1993. Sectorial output has 
been practically stagnant and therefore sectorial output per capita has 
­
decreased. However, these results present important differences; negative 
rates of growth characterize products that previously had high protection 
levels and for which it was impossible to develop comparative advantage. 
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Among these, it is worthwhile mentioning corn, sorghum, potatoes, 
sunflower, black beans, peanuts, sugar cane, pork, and milk. On the other 
hand, products that had low levels of protection or that developed some 
advantage due to vertical integration have reacted positively before trade 
liberalization and de-regulation; this group includes rice, bananas, 
plantains, cocoa, tomato, beans, fish and fish products, poultry, and beef. 
One of the salient characteristics of agricultural output during this period is 
the increase in yields per hectare; sectorial output per hectare increased from 
about 105 tons/hectare in 1989 to about 130 tons/hectare (Gutierrez, 1995). 
This increase is considered to be caused both by a more efficient use of 
inputs, including land, and by the retirement of marginal (low quality) land. 
Basic data on agricultural production, imports and exports is provided in 
Table 1.7. 
Table 1.7 Venezuelan Basic Agricultural Data (1989-1993) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Sectorial GDPl 2,629.8 2,672.0 2,896.2 3,056.9 2,999.8 
Production index2 131.4 131.8 132.9 136.8 137.4 
Per-eap. Prod/no index2 104.4 102.4 101.0 101.8 100.1 
Agricultural imports3 761.4 613.3 877.9 1,052.8 1,043.1 
Agricultural exports3 233.8 346.3 250.7 263.3 350.3 
1 Source: The World Bank (figures in $ Million) 
2 Source: FAO's AGROSTAT (1979-81=100) 
3 Source: United Nations (figures in $ Million) 
The bolivar devaluation of 1989 and the contraction of aggregate demand 
allowed for the recuperation of Venezuelan agricultural exports and a 
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significant improvement in the sectorial trade balance in 1989 and 1990, 
which diminished to a net deficit of 396 million dollars in 1990 - the lowest 
during the period 1983 - 1993. After this point, agricultural imports 
increased in response to trade liberalization, currency appreciation, and the 
recuperation of aggregate demand and, even though sectorial exports 
continued increasing, the sectorial trade balance worsened to a deficit of 900 
million dollars in 1992 and 1993. It is worth mentioning, however, that 
since the liberalization process was initiated agricultural exports have 
diversified significantly, the exports/imports ratio has improved, and 
agricultural exports now seem to be less correlated to oil exports (Gutierrez, 
1995). It also appears that trade liberalization with Colombia has played an 
important role in fostering Venezuelan agricultural exports; Colombia is 
currently Venezuela's second largest trading partner. 
With the advent of the provisional government in 1993 and that of the new 
government in 1994, some of the economic policies leading to the de­
regulation of the Venezuelan economy have been frozen. In some 
instances, pressures for more protection and the fear of increasing social 
unrest lead to temporary measures that restrict trade openness. 
Phytosanitary certificates issued by the Ministry of Agriculture seem to have 
been used for protectionist purposes (Kennedy, 1994). During 1993 the 
issuing of these certificates was delayed several weeks seemingly in response 
to pressures from domestic producers for more protection and imports of 
pork and poultry were practically banned for a relatively long period. Even 
­
so, no major reversals have been made in relation to the liberalization of 
the agricultural sector. Currently, the most important policy fact impinging 
upon the development of this sector is, however, the lack of definition of a 
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sectorial policy in a moment in which it is experiencing significant 
adjustments. 
-
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2. The Group of Three Free Trade Agreement 
2.1 Background on the Group of Three (G-3) 
The origin of the G-3 dates back to 1989 when the Presidents of Colombia, 
Mexico, and Venezuela announced their intention to pursue further 
economic cooperation among the three countries as a continuation of their 
efforts within the Contadora Groupl. In a joint statement issued in 
September 1990 in the United Nations headquarters in New York, the three 
presidents announced their "... commitment to participate actively in the 
execution of measures that favor the increase in trade among the three 
countries by means of a deeper liberalization ... II and expressed their 
willingness to initiate "... a negotiation and joint analysis process targeted 
towards the assessment of the required measures leading to the definition of 
free trade agreements among the three countries II (Presidencia de la 
Republica de Colombia, 1991). 
In September 1993 an agreement was reached in Caracas by the foreign 
affairs ministers who decided to establish a universal tariff reduction 
schedule applicable to all products, with some exceptions (Cortes, 1993)2. 
According to ECLAC (1995), the treaty implies the immediate liberalization 
1 Originally integrated by Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama, the 
Contadora Group was intended to help provide a political solution to the 
armed conflicts in Central America. 
2 This was a common procedure during the negotiation process. Periodical 
intervention of high range officials removed obstacles that could not have ­
been resolved by the negotiation teams. This type of intervention is 
considered to be an expression of the political will of the presidents to reach 
an agreement, but was highly criticized by affected seCtors. 
55 
of around 62% of exportables from Colombia and Venezuela and 16% of 
those from Mexico. Started in January 1995, the agreement provides for 
automatic and linear tariff elimination for most goods within a ten-year 
span and allows Venezuela a two-year grace period to initiate the 
elimination of tariffs on textiles and apparel products as well as a thirteen­
year period for tariff elimination for the automobile sector; the latter 
concession was granted to Colombia also. In addition, Colombian textile 
exports to Mexico will be subjected to import quotas during the first years of 
the agreement. Special treatment covering the three countries was accorded 
to the agricultural sector. 
The G-3 agreement in practice consists of two similar bilateral accords 
between Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela (BID, 1995). 
Trade relationships between Colombia and Venezuela are ruled according 
to the provisions of the Andean Pact. In fact, in the text of the G-3 it is stated 
that the following chapters do not rule the relationships between Colombia 
and Venezuela: (a) national treatment and market access (chapter III), (b) 
automobile sector measures (chapter IV), (c) agricultural and livestock 
sectors measures (chapter V, Section A), (d) safeguards, (e) unfair trade 
practices (chapter IX), (f) governmental firms measures (chapter XVI), and 
(g) intellectual property measures (chapter XVIII). 
The G-3 constitutes a 170 million consumer market with an aggregate GNP 
of more than 500 billion dollars that represents more than 30 percent of 
­
Latin American population and GNP. However, according to CEPAL (1995), 
several issues must be settled among the three countries to guarantee the 
smooth functioning of the agreement. Among them, it is worthwhile to 
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mention exchange rate misalignment, the existence of different fiscal 
structures, differences between Mexican import tariffs vis-a-vis third 
countries and the Colombian-Venezuelan common external tariff3, and 
disparities in labor legislation. 
2.2 Significance of the Agreement 
Although it is estimated that intra-G-3 trade represents only about 2% of the 
three countries' total trade, the G-3 is expected to boost commerce between 
Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela (CEPAL, 1995). One of the 
main reasons for this expectation is the recent behavior of bilateral trade 
between Colombia and Venezuela. After the reduction or elimination of 
tariffs and the establishment of the common external tariff in 1992, this 
trade grew from 1.02 to 1.66 billion dollars in 1993, making these countries 
mutually the second largest trade partners if oil exports are not taken into 
account (CEPAL, 1955). However, trade has tended to stagnate due to import 
restrictions imposed by Venezuela's macroeconomic difficulties. 
The relative importance of trade among the three countries can be seen in 
Table 2.1. According to United Nations data for 1993, trade flows relevant to 
the G-3 agreement (those between Mexico and Colombia and, Mexico and 
Venezuela) have small shares in each country's trade. Colombia is by far the 
smallest trader within the group and therefore the relative importance of 
potential increases in trade stemming from the agreement is bigger than in 
-

3 As a 'departure' from the Andean Pact, Colombia and Venezuela signed 
in 1992 a bilateral agreement liberalizing most trade and establishing a 
common external tariff. 
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the case of its partners. Nonetheless, the weak economic integration of these 
countries gives rise to doubt about the potential of the agreement to 
effectively boost trade. 
Table 2.1 Value of Trade Among G-3's Member Countries (1993) 
Colombia: 
Mexico: 
Venezuela: 
Total Imports 
Imports from Mexico 
Imports from Venezuel. 
Total Exports 
Exports to Mexico 
Exports to Venezuela 
Total Imports 
Imports from Colombia 
Imports from Venezuel. 
Total Exports 
Exports to Colombia 
Exports to Venezuela 
Total Imports 
Imports from Colombia 
Imports from Mexico 
Total Exports 
Exports to Colombia 
Exports to Mexico 
Value1 Share2 
9,840,820 100 
264,343 2.7 
944,260 9.6 
7,454,866 100 
83,574 1.1 
716,850 9.6 
85,270,907 100 
83,994 0.1 
226,929 0.3 
51,698,167 100 
236,783 0.5 
225,267 0.4 
11,266,625 100 
469,579 4.2 
219,258 2.0 
15,208,136 100 
910,078 6.0 
224.351 1.5 
1. Values in U.s. $000 
2. As a percentage of total imports or exports 
Data discrepancies are due to differences in countries' reports 
Source: United Nations data 
-

Tables 2.2 and 2.3 present the G-3's structure of trade at the three digit level 
of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) for 1993. These 
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tables show that Mexican exports to its G-3 partners are dominated by 
intermediate goods and that Venezuelan exports to Mexico have the same 
characteristic. On the contrary, Colombian exports to Mexico tend to be more 
of the final-good type. Another characteristic of intra-G-3 trade is that it is 
spread over a relatively wide group of products. This feature may favor the 
chance for increasing trade once tariffs are reduced, because of the wide 
range of activities involved. Yet, it may be simultaneously regarded as 
negative in the sense that even the products with the highest shares within 
bilateral trade currently do not have strong positions in the market. 
Table 2.2	 Structure of Trade Flows Between Mexico and Colombia at the 
Three Digit Level of the SITC in 1993 
Main Colombian Imports from Mexicot 
Carboxylic acids (513) 
Passenger motor vehicles, except buses (781) 
Lorries and other special vehicles (782) 
Motor vehicle parts and accessories (784) 
Medicinal and pharmaceutical products (541) 
Synthetic and reclaimed rubber (233) 
Other products'" 
20.0 
12.4 
5.0 
4.5 
3.3 
3.1 
51.7 
Main Colombian Exports to Mexicot 
Printed matter (892) 
Coal, lignite, and peat (322) 
Pesticides and disinfectants (591) 
Articles of plastic not elsewhere specified (893) 
Paper (642) 
Other products'" 
25.8 
9.3 
6.6 
4.9 
4.0 
49.4 
-
f As a percentage of the corresponding value of trade with Mexico 
... Each group contributing less than 3 percent 
Numbers in parenthesis correspond to the SITC's codes 
Source: United Nations data 
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Table 2.3	 Structure of Trade Flows Between Mexico and Venezuela at the 
Three Digit Level of the SITC in 1993 
Main Venezuelan Imports from Mexicot 
Passenger motor vehicles, except buses (781) 16.5 
Carboxylic acids (513) 6.9 
Automatic data processing equipment (752) 6.0 
Copper, except cement copper (682) 5.4 
Other inorganic chemicals (523) 4.7 
Hydrocarbons and other derivatives n.e.s. (511) 4.0 
Other products'" 56.5 
Main Venezuelan Exports to Mexicot 
Aluminum (684) 38.5 
Refined petroleum products (334) 14.6 
Iron and steel universal plates and sheets (674) 10.3 
Other organic chemicals (516) 9.8 
Miscellaneous chemical products, n.e.s. (598) 5.2 
Iron and steel shapes (673) 4.8 
Other products'" 16.8 
t As a percentage of the corresponding value of imports (exports) from (to) 
Mexico 
... Each group contributing less than 3 percent 
Numbers in parenthesis correspond to the SITC's code 
Source: United Nations data 
Despite these conditions, analysts consider there to be potential trade flow 
increases for most sectors that are currently traded (initially favoring 
Colombian and Venezuelan exports due to the asymmetric nature of the 
treaty). For instance, the Colombian Ministry of Foreign Trade (1993) 
-

suggests that Colombian exports to Mexico may increase considerably and its 
market share will grow to reach levels of 35 percent in the case of the 
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printing industry, 45 percent for textiles and apparel products, 50 percent for 
leather products, and 80 percent for agricultural products4• 
However, the macroeconomic crisis that affects both Mexico and Venezuela 
negatively influences the prospects for significant trade increases. 
Furthermore, currency devaluations in 1994 in Venezuela and Mexico may 
have a depressing effect on trade growth. The reduced pre-agreement level 
of trade between Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela may also 
be an indicator of potentially meager results. Nonetheless, the agreement 
has been criticized by analysts such as Moises Nairn on the grounds that "... 
subregional pacts such as that between Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela are 
unjustified, and reflect a protectionist mindset that is no longer 
appropriate" (Selwitz, 1994; p. 6 - quoting M. Nairn). According to this 
perspective, a distinguishing characteristic of this type of agreement is that it 
is market-reform oriented instead of lSI oriented as before. Summarizing, 
the expected outcome of the G-3 (as in most cases of formal economic 
integration) is unknown and its assessment awaits empirical study. 
2.3 Structure of the Agreement 
Below is a general description of the content of the agreement, its objectives, 
scope, and special measures. 
-

4 The Colombian Foreign Trade Ministry considered in 1993 that Colombian 
exports to Mexico may be increased up to ten times its value (83.6 million 
dollars in 1993) once the integration process is complete. 
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2.3.1 Objectives and Generalities 
The three countries have committed themselves to strengthening their 
economic relationships through the creation of an expanded market for 
their goods and services, as well as to enhance their productive activities, 
investment, and technological development. Consequently, the objectives 
of the treaty include the promotion of market expansion and 
diversification, the elimination of trade barriers, the enhancement of 
competitiveness, the increase of investment, the protection of intellectual 
property, the establishment of procedures for cooperation, the creation of 
efficient mechanisms for dispute resolution, and the maintenance of 
equitable relationships among the three countries given their recognition 
that differential treatment among them is allowed according to LAIA's 
rules. 
It was agreed that the accord will last for at least three years, after which it 
will be renewed for an indefinite period. Withdrawal of any of the countries 
from the treaty is allowed 180 days after notification to LAIA. Accession of 
new member countries is open to Latin American and Caribbean countries 
subject to the approval of the three partners. There is no obligation for 
member countries to harmonize their macroeconomic policies and each of 
them is free to apply its own trade policy; however, Colombia and 
Venezuela are ruled in this respect by the Andean Pact. Finally, the accord 
does not establish a supra-national organism (it is administered through a 
special commission) and each member country is solely responsible before 
third parties. 
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2.3.2 Market Access and Trade of Goods 
The G-3 establishes that parties will give national treatment, according to 
Article III of the GAIT, to their respective goods and therefore will avoid 
any type of trade discrimination. It was also agreed that import tariffs and 
taxes will not be increased for goods complying with rules of origin 
regulations and that non-tariff barriers affecting intra-G-3 trade will be 
eliminated. However, export support programs that make use of tax rebates 
were allowed to continue operating within the agreement (this measure 
applies to the Colombian Plan Vallejo, the Mexican PITES, and the 
Venezuelan Esquema de Perfeccionamiento Activo). On the other hand, 
member countries have the right to determine reference prices based on 
international prices in order to control the fulfillment of anti-dumping 
practices and apply sanctions if necessary. 
To guarantee market access, a tariff elimination schedule was defined in 
which complete tariff elimination will occur within a ten year span by 
means of uniform reductions starting in January 1995 followed by a second 
one in July 1996 and eight successive annual reductions that will be finished 
in 2004. To determine the starting tariff level, within the accord the regional 
tariff preference previously negotiated in the framework of LAIA was 
included. It was decided to extend this preference to the universe of 
products; consequently, Mexico applied a 28% tariff reduction to Colombian 
-

and Venezuelan products and the latter applied a 12% tariff reduction to 
Mexican products; this procedure established the starting point for the tariff 
elimination schedule. 
63
 
Tariff elimination is determined to occur reciprocally and gradually 
according to three categories: (1) immediate elimination in Colombia, 
Venezuela and Mexico, (2) immediate elimination in Mexico and a five year 
elimination period in Colombia and Venezuela, and (3) ten year 
elimination period in the three countries. Exempt from tariff elimination, 
but allowed full market access, were some agricultural products that are 
considered to be highly sensitive, the automobile sector for the first two 
years of the agreement (there is, though, the commitment to completely 
liberalize this sector at the end of the twelfth year - with the only exception 
being the used transportation vehicles market), and the textile and apparel 
sectors in the case of Venezuela5 . The completion of the tariff elimination 
schedule may be accelerated if the parties agree to do so for any type of 
product. 
In special cases market access is restricted. Colombia does not grant national 
treatment for the production of alcoholic beverages, a state monopoly, and 
may restrict trade in this kind of good; it also may restrict trade in products 
used in producing energy as well as in used goods. Mexico may restrict trade 
in used goods (except for transborder services) as well as in petroleum and 
its derivatives and used transportation vehicles. Similarly, Venezuela may 
restrict trade in petroleum and its derivatives. Additionally, labeling 
regulations were established and the creation of export taxes was explicitly 
In this case import quotas were eliminated and especial 'temporary5
flexibilization levels' - ranges of sectorial trade values - were determined in .­
order to allow for a more flexible application of rules of origin regulations; 
'temporary flexibilization levels' were established also in the case of 
Colombia-Mexico bilateral trade in this products. 
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prohibited unless they apply to an agreed list of staples and for purposes of 
poverty alleviation or supply stabilization when domestic prices are 
maintained below the international level. 
The liberalization program only applies to goods that originate in any of the 
three countries. To establish this condition a set of rules of origin were 
included, according to which products that are entirely obtained or produced 
in the territory of one or more of the parties are admissible for tariff 
reductions. Similarly, products in which production use is comprised of 
imports from outside the region are considered admissible if these products 
have undergone a 'substantial transformation' within any of the member 
countries such that they shift from one customs classification to another. 
There are some cases in which a product is admissible even if it does not 
fulfill the requirement of shifting customs classifications. The condition 
applied in this case is that this product must have a minimum content of 
regional inputs that is calculated according to the transaction value method. 
Chemical products must have a regional content of at least 40% that will be 
increased to 45% in the forth year and to 50% after the sixth year. The 
machinery sector is required to have 50% regional content; the rest of sectors 
must have at least 50% of regional content during the first five years of the 
agreement and 55% thereafter. Compared to LAIA's rules of origin, those of 
the G-3 are more restrictive both in regional content and in their application 
along the different steps of the production process (as in the textiles sector). 
-

The agreement includes two types of safeguard clauses. Both clauses were 
conceived as protective measures and were intended to be used in case of 
economic disruption. First, a bilateral safeguard may be invoked during the 
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first fifteen years of the agreement and provides for one year suspension of 
the schedule of tariff elimination that may be renewed for another year. Use 
of this clause causes the payment of compensation charges from the 
invoking country to the affected countries as established in the GATT. 
Second, a multilateral safeguard clause ruled by Article XIX of the GATT 
permits the temporary imposition of a tariff or import quota to products 
imported from any supplier with the exception of G-3 partners, unless their 
products represent a substantial share of the damaging imports and make an 
important contribution to the undesired damage. This clause is permanent. 
As usual, safeguard clauses can only be invoked in case of generalized 
apparent damage to domestic production or threat of generalized damage. 
Similarly, mechanisms were established aimed to guarantee the 
effectiveness and transparency of anti-dumping and subsidy inquiries. 
These mechanisms are consistent with each of the partners' laws, as well as 
with GATT rules. Member countries are allowed to establish and apply 
countervailing measures in cases in which it is proved that there are 
dumping practices or payment of export subsidies. These measures require 
the level of dumping to exceed 2% of the nominal value of the good in 
question, the subsidy to be above the 1% ad-valorem level, or the volume of 
imports under inquiry account for more than 1% of the internal market 
(2.5% in the case of various suppliers). There are also norms regulating 
notification procedures, time periods for investigations, and the right to 
defense. 
.. 
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2.3.3 Other Topics 
As was mentioned, the scope of the G-3 goes beyond the trade of goods. 
Drawing closely on the lines established by the NAFfA, the accord includes 
provisions related to services, including communications and finance, 
investment, intellectual property, and governmental purchases. The most 
salient characteristics of these topics are presented below. 
In general, services are to be gradually liberalized according to two principles 
that were discussed at the GATT's Uruguay Round. First, national 
treatment is to be given to nationals from any of the three signing countries. 
Second, under the most favored nation principle, G-3 member countries 
must receive benefits granted to third parties by any of the members of the 
group, including preferences granted by Mexico to the U.S. and Canada 
under the NAFTA. Similarly, no member country is allowed to require 
service sector firms to establish branches or representatives in the country 
where they plan to sell their services and the intra-G-3 temporary admission 
of persons is facilitated in order to promote the flow of business 
representatives of service firms. 
Regarding the telecommunications sector, it was agreed to liberalize those 
services in which some value has been added. The criteria to determine 
whether or not value has been added relates to the use of computerized 
processing systems that modify the form, content, codes, or other aspects of 
-
the information being transmitted to patrons in such a way that a new 
service, different from the basic one used as an input, is provided. There is 
guaranteed, non-discriminatory access to telecommunication networks of 
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any of the three countries for intra-G-3 operations in value added 
communication services. Maritime transportation was also liberalized, 
eliminating the requirement that a certain proportion of transported 
products should be carried in national flag ships. Analogously, measures 
were adopted to enhance the liberalization of air transportation. 
The accord grants national treatment to investors from the three countries 
and Mexico extends to Colombia and Venezuela the same investment 
benefits that it conceded to the U.S. and Canada under the NAFTA. 
Intellectual property regulations were set according to the principles of 
national treatment and most favored nation in cases of identical 
trademarks, notoriously similar trademarks, and denominations of origin; 
the Common Andean Regime provided the basis for these regulations. In 
addition, copyright was agreed to be ruled according to each country's 
legislation. Purchases made by the public sector were also partially 
liberalized and the three countries agreed to give each other national 
treatment in this respect; however, thresholds were defined to act as 
minimum points beyond which the regulations of the treaty are triggered. 
Finally, the administration of the treaty was assigned to the Administrative 
Committee formed by the respective ministers of foreign trade and other 
related ministries. Some responsibilities were assigned to the commercial 
section of the three countries' diplomatic representatives and a number of 
committees, sub-committees, and task forces were created to serve special 
-

purposes - such as supervising the fulfillment of the agreement, providing 
information to governments and to the public, and providing means for 
dispute resolution - or further developing specific areas of the accord. 
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2.4 The Agricultural Sector in the G-3 Agreement 
Trade in agricultural products is one of the least liberalized sectors of the G-3 
agreement. Five provisions were established to cover trade in agriculture: 
(1) member countries commit themselves to facilitate market access 
through the reduction or elimination of barriers to reciprocal trade, such as 
import restrictions, import taxes, and trade regulations; (2) for those 
products included in the tariff elimination schedule, parties do not use 
quantitative restrictions, price bands or price stabilization mechanisms, or 
variable levies; (3) each party defined a list of products excluded from tariff 
elimination; these, considered sensitive products, may be excluded and can 
be traded under prior import license mechanisms, or may be subject to price 
bands, or simply excluded from the tariff elimination program without 
other requirements; (4) an agricultural trade committee will annually 
suggest to member countries the inclusion of products under the list 
mentioned above in the tariff elimination program - a procedure was 
established to verify this process; and (5) two special arrangements were 
defined; one for sugar and the other for products included under the tariff 
elimination program on a temporary basis. 
None of the most significant agricultural products in intra-G-3 trade was 
included in the tariff elimination program - the only exceptions may be fish, 
either fresh, frozen, preserved or prepared, for Mexico; cocoa for Colombia; 
tuna fish, its derivatives, and cocoa for Venezuela; and vegetables for ­
Mexico. Most meat and dairy products, as well as grains and its derivatives 
(starch, oil, and cakes) are excluded from the liberalization program; the 
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same policy applies to cotton, some fresh fruits and vegetables, all preserved 
and prepared fruits and vegetables, and animal feed. Products under the 
Andean Pact's price band mechanism (applying to Colombia and 
Venezuela), although excluded from tariff elimination, are subject to 
ALADl's regional tariff preferences. No further additions of products to the 
lists of goods under prior license systems or price band (or price 
stabilization) mechanisms were allowed once the G-3 came into effect. 
Sugar trade is regulated by means of a special arrangement administered by 
a sugar analysis committee that was scheduled to seek an agreement in 
these areas within the first six months of operation of the accord. The 
arrangement provides for the establishment of an import quota for 
Colombian and Venezuelan sugar to be imported to Mexico, to be activated 
in those years in which Mexico acts as an importer and without prejudice to 
the agreements that the latter has established with Central American 
countries and other third parties (including NAFTA partners). Similarly, 
the committee must define the mechanism to regulate Mexican sugar access 
to Colombian and Venezuelan markets. In defining both import quotas and 
the market access mechanism, Mexico was allowed to fulfill its GATT­
related obligations and Colombia and Venezuela to maintain their price 
band system or other price stabilization mechanism. Rules were also 
established to regulate reciprocal sugar trade in case the respective 
committee is unable to reach an agreement; these basically define the 
corresponding tariffs to be applied. 
-

A group of products was temporarily included in the tariff elimination 
program; in this case, a special tariff reduction schedule was defined, 
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establishing a 15% tariff reduction to be linearly accomplished within the 
first six years of the accord; the tariff level reached at the end of the sixth 
year will be maintained between the seventh and tenth year and then will 
be reduced to zero in proportional amounts between the eleventh and 
fifteenth year. Special safeguard mechanisms, based on tariff-quotas, were 
set for these products to be applied between the eleventh and fourteenth 
years. Most products included in this group are fruits and vegetables; 
tomatoes (fresh, chilled, prepared and preserved), onions, carrots, melons, 
watermelons, chick peas, and prepared or preserved asparagus (except in 
vinegar) are the most relevant. The list also includes mayonnaise for the 
three countries, non-decaffeinated and decaffeinated green coffee in the case 
of Colombia (applying to trade with Mexico and Venezuela) and Mexico 
(applying only to trade with Colombia), and orange juice (frozen and in 
other forms) in the case of Colombia and Venezuela. 
Mexico and Venezuela were granted the reciprocal right to use special 
safeguard mechanisms (tariff-quotas) for the following products: cucumbers, 
hot peppers, fresh garlic, avocados, and fresh and dried oranges in the case 
of Venezuelan imports from Mexico, and mangoes, guavas, preparations for 
soups, beer, rum, and meat flour in the case of Mexican imports from 
Venezuela. 
G-3 parties recognize the potentially distortive nature of domestic 
production-support policies and agreed on the use of policies with minimal 
-

effects on trade or that are exempted from any reduction commitment 
arising from GAIT negotiations. Each member country is entitled to modify 
its domestic production support measures, including those that are 
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subjected to GATT commitments. Similarly, G-3 parties agreed to eliminate 
export subsidies for the agricultural sector. Therefore, it was agreed that 
products included in the tariff elimination program may maintain any 
export subsidy they were receiving previous to their inclusion for three 
more years. From the forth year on, the subsidy must be reduced in equal 
annual proportions so that its elimination will be completed 
simultaneously with that of tariffs. Member countries also renounce any 
right arising from multilateral negotiations to make use of export subsidies 
for the agricultural sector and to only resort to them by previous agreement 
among the affected parties. 
There is, however, a major exception to the de-regulation process affecting 
the agricultural sector. Export taxes can be retained when applying to each 
country's list of staples and its inputs (which are mostly food products) if the 
corresponding revenues or benefits are intended to: (1) assist targeted 
consumers, or (2) assure the availability of these goods when they are 
included in stabilization programs that imply the maintenance of domestic 
prices below international levels. Besides, Colombia is allowed to use 
stabilization funds for agricultural goods for export and to keep export taxes 
for coffee and panela (dehydrated molasses). 
Two committees were established to assure the proper functioning of 
agricultural trade in the framework of the agreement. First, a committee on 
technical and marketing regulations was created, aimed at guaranteeing a 
smooth functioning of packaging, grading, and quality rules, as well as to 
recommend measures to harmonize these rules when necessary. Second, 
the agricultural marketing committee is expected to follow up the 
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development of the agreement in this sector and to serve as a forum for the 
discussion of any relevant issue in the field. Finally, a set of phytosanitary 
and zoosanitary regulations were adopted; according to them each party has 
the right to establish its own regulations (which may be stricter than 
international recommendations) and must fulfill requirements intended to 
secure their compliance with scientific principles, to act on a basis of non­
discriminatory treatment, and to avoid being a source of disguised 
protectionism. A phytosanitary and zoosanitary committee was established 
to oversee, control, and develop any activity related to this field. 
-
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3. The G-3's Agricultural Trade 
3.1 Significance of Agricultural Trade within G-3 Trade 
Largely as a consequence of the development of the oil industry, the 
agricultural sector is of less economic importance to Mexico and Venezuela 
than it is to Colombia. In 1992, the agricultural sector accounted for 17 
percent of Colombia's GDP while in the cases of Mexico and Venezuela its 
share was only 9 and 5 percent, respectively (Valdes, 1994; Kennedy, 1994). 
Regarding foreign trade, the situation of the agricultural sector is similar to 
that in production. Agricultural trade represented 18.9 percent of total trade 
(imports plus exports) for Colombia in 1993, 7.5 percent for Mexico, and 5.3 
percent for Venezuela1. 
The recent behavior of the share of agricultural trade in G-3 countries' 
foreign trade is presented in Table 3.1. From these data, it is apparent that 
agricultural imports, as a percentage of total imports, have been relatively 
stable in the cases of Colombia and Venezuela while in the case of Mexico 
its relative importance has been declining (although its absolute value has 
increased2). Agricultural exports, on the other hand, have declined in 
1 Figures in this chapter, unless otherwise specified, come from United 
Nations data (see references). For the purposes of this chapter, the 
agricultural sector is defined as covering the following groups of the 
Standard International Trade Classification (rev. 3): "Food and Live 
Animals" (group 0); "Tobacco, unmanufactured" (group 121); "Hides, skins, 
furskins, raw" (group 21); "Oil-seeds, oleaginous fruits" (group 22); "Natural 
rubber, etc." (group 231); "Cotton" (group 263); and "Crude animal, vegetable ­
materials" (group 29) - for a detailed list, see Appendix l. 
2 Absolute figures for this table (as well as those relevant to other tables 
along this chapter) are reported in Appendix 2. 
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relative importance for Colombia and Mexico while those of Venezuela 
have experienced a slight growth. 
Table 3.1 Share of Agricultural Trade in G-3 Countries' Foreign Trade 
Agricultural Imports as a percentage of Total Imports1 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 6.8 7.0 6.3 9.5 7.6 
Mexico 15.5 15.2 10.6 11.2 8.0 
Venezuela 10.8 9.3 8.8 8.3 9.3 
Agricultural Exports as a percentage of Total Exports2 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 42.0 36.9 37.1 38.4 33.8 
Mexico 11.8 11.2 12.0 10.7 6.9 
Venezuela 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.9 2.3 
Agricultural Trade as a percentage of Total Trade3 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 25.6 23.4 24.6 24.2 18.9 
Mexico 13.7 13.2 11.2 11.0 7.5 
Venezuela 4.9 3.9 4.5 4.9 5.3 
1. (Magi / Mtoti) .. 100; i =Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
2. (Xagi / Xtoti) .. 100; i =Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
3. [(Magi + Xagi) / (Mtoti + Xtoti)] .. 100; i =Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
-

The share of agricultural trade in total trade has decreased for Colombia and 
Mexico and has been relatively stable for Venezuela, although modestly 
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increasing. However, it is worth noting that the significance of agricultural 
trade for Colombia is higher than for its partner countries. This fact is clearly 
due to the importance of agricultural exports, particularly coffee which in 
1993 still accounted for about 16 percent of total Colombian exports. 
However, between 1989 and 1993 Colombian agricultural exports grew at an 
annual average rate of 1 percent and, if this situation remains in the near 
future, agricultural trade will continue to lose weight within total trade3. In 
the case of Mexico, the future importance of agricultural trade for the 
economy is uncertain. After the NAFfA came into effect in January 1994, 
both agricultural imports and exports were expected to grow, but the extent 
to which this growth may lead them to gain share within the total Mexican 
trade will depend on the behavior of the other economic sectors and on the 
dynamics of the domestic market. On the other hand, according to 
Venezuelan data reported by the United Nations, the increase in 
Venezuelan agricultural exports between 1991 and 1993 is almost entirely 
due to bilateral trade with Colombia (trade liberalization between the two 
countries was reached in 1992). During this period, Venezuelan agricultural 
exports to Colombia grew at an annual average rate of 62 percent increasing 
its share in Venezuelan agricultural exports from 7.5 to 37 percent. The 
bolivar devaluation of 1994 is expected to partially reinforce the tendency 
3 Markets' evolution for the most important Colombian agricultural 
exports is not favorable. International prices for coffee has been declining 
and unstable since the collapse of the International Coffee Agreement; the 
introduction of the E.U.'s common agricultural policy on bananas (the 
second largest Colombian agricultural export) reduced market share for 
Colombian exports and tends to depress international prices; and the issuing ­
of the NAFTA as well as claims for protection by American producers, pose .­
a potential threat on Colombian exports of cut flowers to the U.S. (the third 
most important Colombian agricultural export and its main target market, 
respectively). 
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towards the relative diminution of the agricultural imports share while 
increasing that of agricultura( exports. 
The share of agricultural trade in G-3 trade is shown in Table 3.2. 
Comparing these data with those related to the share of agricultural trade in 
each of the partner countries' trade (Table 3.1) it is possible to draw the 
following conclusions. First, agricultural imports tend to be less important 
within intra-G-3 trade than within total trade for the three member 
countries. Second, in Colombia and Mexico agricultural exports are notably 
less significant within the G-3 than in their whole export structure, since 
both countries target their agricultural exports towards DC markets. On the 
other hand, even though Venezuelan agricultural exports within the G-3 
are also less important than in its whole export structure, their share tends 
to be closer to that of agricultural exports in total exports. Third, the 
combined effect of the previous observations shows that G-3's agricultural 
trade is less significant for the three countries than their total agricultural 
trade is within the respective trade structures. However, in the case of 
Venezuela this conclusion does not hold for 1989 and 1990. 
The comparison between these trade structures can be put into perspective 
by observing the relative importance of intra-G-3 trade within member 
countries' aggregate trade. As Table 3.3 shows, intra-G-3 agricultural trade 
has very low shares in member countries' aggregate agricultural trade. In 
fact, during the period 1989-1993/ intra-G-3 agricultural trade represented 
-
less than one percent of member countries' agricultural trade. Very low 
shares also characterize total intra-G-3 trade. In this case, however, all 
figures are slightly higher than those corresponding to agriculture. 
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Table 3.2 Share of G-3's Agricultural Trade in G-3's Trade ... 
G-3 Agricultural Imports as a percentage of:1 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
G-3 Total Imports 4.1 9.4 1.0 0.9 1,5 
Colombian G-3 Imports 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.9 1.2 
Mexican G-3 Imports 6.6 17.5 1.3 0.8 1.5 
Venezuelan G-3 Impts. 6.4 2.7 0.9 1.0 1.8 
G-3 Agricultural Exports as a percentage of:2 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
G-3 Total Exports 4.1 9.4 1.0 0.9 1,5 
Colombian G-3 Exports 17.8 19.7 1.5 2.3 1.8 
Mexican G-3 Exports 2.7 1.7 0.7 0.9 1.5 
Venezuelan G-3 Exports 2.8 17.0 1.3 0.2 1.4 
G-3 Agricultural Trade as a percentage of:3 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
G-3 Total Trade 4.1 9.4 1.0 0.9 1,5 
Colombian G-3 Trade 3.7 5.5 0.8 1.2 1.3 
Mexican G-3 Trade 4.1 9.4 1.0 0.9 1.5 
Venezuelan G-3 Trade 4.5 11.4 1.1 0.6 1.6 
... Due to inconsistencies between data reported by the different countries, 
bilateral flows were averaged. Original data are reported in Appendix 2. 
1. (L Magij / L Mtotij) ... 100; where i = importing country 
j j j = exporting countries 
2. (L xagij / L Xtotij) ... 100; where i =exporting country 
j j j =importing countries 
-

3. [L (Mag + Xag) / L (Mtot + xtothj] ... 100; where: i =reference country 
j j j = partner countries 
In all cases i and j =Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela and i '# j 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
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Table 3.3	 Share of Intra-G-3 Agricultural and Total Trade in Member 
Countries' Aggregate Agricultural and Total Trade 
Intra G-3 Imports as a percentage of:1 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Agricultural Imports 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Total Imports 0.8 1.1 0.9 1.0 0.9 
Intra G-3 Exports as a percentage of:2 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Agricultural Exports 0.2 0.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Total Exports 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.4 1.1 
Intra G-3 Trade as a percentage of:3 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Agricultural Trade 0.2 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Total Trade 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.0 
1. (LL Magij / L Magi) '" 100 and (LL Mtotij / L Mtoti) '" 100, respectively 
ij i ij i 
where i = importing country, j = exporting countries, and i '# j 
2. (LL Xagij / L Xagi) '" 100 and (LL Xtotij / L Xtoti) '" 100, respectively 
ij i ij i 
where i =exporting country, j =importing countries, and i '# j 
3. [LL (xagij + Magij)/ L (Xagi + Magi)] '" 100 and 
i j	 i 
[(LL (Xtotij + Mtotij)/ L (Xtoti + Mtoti)] '" 100, respectively	 ­
i j i 
In all cases i and j =Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela and i '# j 
Source: U. N. (see References section) 
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3.2	 G-3's Agricultural Trade in the Context of Member Countries' 
Agricultural Trade 
Indicators for the G-3 as a whole, such as those presented in Table 3.3 above, 
may be misleading in that they are heavily influenced by the relatively large 
size of the Mexican economy as compared to those of its G-3 partners. 
However, when each G-3 partner is considered separately, it can be seen that 
the relative importance of G-3 total and agricultural trade is practically 
negligible at this level too. Comparatively, total intra-G-3 trade is slightly 
more important for Colombia, intermediate for Venezuela, and less 
important for Mexico. Tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 show for each member country 
the share of its intra-G-3 agricultural trade with respect to its agricultural 
trade and provides as a way of comparison the same indicator for its total G­
3 trade. 
Table 3.4 shows that the shares of intra-G-3 agricultural imports in member 
countries' agricultural imports are lower than the shares of intra-G-3 
imports in total imports. This indicate that agricultural imports are less 
significant in the G-3 than in the whole import structure of these countries. 
Even though the shares of intra-G-3 agricultural imports are very similar 
for the three countries, those of total intra G-3 imports show some 
differences among them. Imports from G-3 partners are relatively more 
important for Colombia, intermediate for Venezuela, and less important for 
Mexico. 
­
.­
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Table 3.4 Share of Intra-G-3 Agricultural and Total Imports in 
Agricultural and Total Imports by Member Country 
Agricultural Imports from G-3 Partners as a percentage of:1 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian Agricult. Imports 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Mexican Agricultural 1mports 0.2 0.9 0.1 0 0.1 
Venezuelan Agricult. Imports 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Imports from G-3 Partners as a percentage of:2 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian Total Imports 2.3 2.0 3.2 3.1 2.6 
Mexican Total Imports 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.5 
Venezuelan Total Imports 0.9 1.8 1.4 1.8 2.0 
1. [(L Magij) / Magi] .. 100, where i = importing country 
j j =exporting countries 
2. [(L Mtotij) / Mtoti] .. 100, where i =importing country 
j j = exporting countries 
In all cases i and j =Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela and i '* j 
Source: U.N. (see References Section) 
Contrary to the imports case, Table 3.5 shows that the difference between the 
shares of agricultural exports and those corresponding to total exports is 
smaller. This indicates that the behavior of pre-agreement intra-G-3 
agricultural exports tends to be closer to the pattern of member countries' 
exports than it is for imports. The relative importance of intra-G-3 exports is 
­
the largest for Venezuela, followed closely by that of Mexico, and is the 
lowest for Colombia. 
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Table 3.5	 Share of Intra-G-3 Agricultural and Total Exports in Agricultural 
and Total Exports by Member Country 
Agricultural Exports to G-3 Partners as a percentage of:1 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian Agricult. Exports 0.2 0.3 0 0.1 0.1 
Mexican Agricultural Exports 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 
Venezuelan Agricult. Exports 0.9 8.8 0.7 0.2 0.9 
Exports to G-3 Partners as a percentage of:2 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian Total Exports 0.4 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.1 
Mexican Total Exports 0.8 0.9 1.1 1.6 0.9 
Venezuelan Total Exports 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.4 1.5 
1. [(L Xagij) / Xagi] It 100, where i =exporting country 
j j = importing countries 
2. [(L Xtotij) / Xtoti] It 100, where i =exporting country 
j j = importing countries 
In all cases i and j =Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela and i ~ j 
Source: U.N. (see References Section) 
Table 3.6 presents the summary of intra-G-3 agricultural trade in terms of its 
importance in the context of each member country's agricultural trade and 
allows for a comparison with total intra-G-3 trade. As shown, intra-G-3 
agricultural trade is relatively more important for Venezuela but is 
negligible in all cases. On the other hand, total intra-G-3 trade is more 
important for Colombia than for the other two countries, being the least ­
important for Mexico and intermediate for Venezuela. 
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Table 3.6	 Share of Intra-G-3 Agricultural and Total Trade in Agricultural 
and Total Trade by Member Country 
Agricultural Trade with G-3 Partners as a percentage of:1 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian Agricultural Trade 0.2 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Mexican Agricultural Trade 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Venezuelan Agricult. Trade 0.6 3.5 0.3 0.2 0.5 
Trade with G-3 Partners as a percentage of:2 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian Trade 1.3 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.9 
Mexican Trade 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.7 
Venezuelan Trade 0.7 1.2 1.1 1.6 1.7 
1. {[L (xagij + Magij )11 (Xagi + Magi )} * 100, where: i = reference country 
j j = partner countries 
2. {[L (xtotij + Mtotij )} / (Xtoti + Mtoti )} * 100, where: i =reference country 
j j =partner countries 
In all cases i and j =Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela and i ¢ j 
Source: U.N. (see References Section) 
3.3 G-3's Agricultural Trade 
The following general characterization of G-3's agricultural trade stems 
from the conclusions of the two previous sections. First agricultural trade is 
clearly more important for Colombia than it is for its partner countries. 
However,	 its importance has been declining significantly. Second, when ­
compared	 to the whole trade structure, the weight of agricultural trade 
within the G-3 is very low for the three countries. Third, when the structure 
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of intra-G-3 trade is compared to the structure of each of the partner 
countries' trade, it is observed that intra-G-3 trade is 'biased' against 
agricultural products. Fourth, as shown in Table 3.7, the volume of intra-G­
3 agricultural trade is extremely low. 
Table 3.7 Intra-G-3 Agricultural Trade ( $ million) 
Importing Country: Colombia 
Exporting Country: 1989 
Mexico 0.8 
1990 
0.8 
1991 
0.9 
1992 
1.8 
1993 
3.0 
Importing Country: Mexico 
Exporting Country: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 4.4 7.6 0.8 1.6 1.5
 
Venezuela 2.0 30.4 1.7 0.4 3.2
 
Importing Country: Venezuela 
Exporting Country: 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
 
Mexico 4.1 3.2 1.2 2.1 4.0
 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Another characteristic of intra-G-3 agricultural trade is its relative 
instability, which may be partially due to a variety of causes related to 
protected markets. Among these is the discretionary relaxation of trade 
regulations or deviations from customary trade patterns because of 
shortages or abnormal market situations. Lack of competitiveness of partner ­
countries' products may be another cause of instability. Exceptionally high 
prices may allow these products to temporarily enter a market without the 
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possibility of establishing stable trade relationships. The low volume of 
trade of most products is also a possible cause of instability since it does not 
favor the development of conditions for meaningful trade flows. 
Examination of data in Table 3.7 indicates that Colombian agricultural 
imports from Mexico have a clear upward trend. The rest of intra-G-3 
agricultural flows presents an erratic behavior. The coefficient of variation 
for Colombian exports to Mexico during the period 1989-1993 was 80 percent, 
that corresponding to Mexican imports from Venezuela was 152 percent, 
and that for Mexican exports to Venezuela was 38 percent. 
The instability of intra-G-3 agricultural trade is even more marked at the 
product level. Only a very few products show identifiable patterns of trade 
flows and a large number do not register commerce at all for some years4. 
Tables 3.8 to 3.11 show the annual share of the main groups of agricultural 
products that were bilaterally traded by the G-3 partners from 1989 to 19935, 
their average level of share during the period 1989-1993, and the coefficient 
of variation for their annual traded values. 
As shown in Table 3.8, traditionally the most important group of 
agricultural products that Mexico has exported to Colombia is sugar and 
honey. Although both its share within annual trade flows and its traded 
-

4 There is the possibility that trade flows for certain products become so 
reduced that they do not appear reported on trade statistics. The U.N., for 
example, does not publish trade flows below $100.000; 
5 Groups are defined at the three-digits level of the SITe. 
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values have fluctuated, this group still contributes a significant part of 
bilateral trade flows. 
Table 3.8 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Colombia and Mexico 
(Importing Country: Colombia, Exporting Country: Mexico)" 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 AS1: CV# 
Cereal preparations 2.8 3.0 6.7 2.5 133.7 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserv 0.9 0.8 25.7 5.5 193.2 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dry 3.1 1.6 3.5 2.0 4.0 2.8 83.2 
Fruit/Vegetable juices 6.9 7.7 2.9 131.5 
Sugar and honey 62.4 28.6 39.8 43.6 19.7 38.8 37.4 
Coffee and substitutes 15.0 2.8 3.6 144.2 
Spices 4.3 21.4 2.5 4.8 3.4 7.3 62.6 
Feeding stuff for animals 2.0 0.9 3.1 1.2 134.7 
Edible products, nes (098)t 15.3 21.1 22.1 25.9 25.4 21.9 69.2 
Crude vegetable materials 14.9 15.1 12.3 9.3 4.4 11.2 13.4 
Other products 11.4 2.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
.. Percentages 
1: Average share for the period 
# Coefficient of variation for the series of traded values 
t not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
The group corresponding to edible products has had a relatively large and 
increasing share within annual trade flows. At the end of the period 1989­
1993, this group registered the second largest share for this type of trade. 
-

Crude and vegetable materials is the group that has maintained the highest 
stability in terms of traded values. However, given that Colombian imports 
from Mexico have been increasing steadily from 1990 on, this group has lost 
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importance relative to others. As of 1993, the group including fresh and 
simply preserved vegetables obtained the largest share within Colombian 
imports from Mexico accounting for more than one quarter of this trade 
flow. Nonetheless, during the four previous years this group had a very low 
or null share, a situation that jointly with the low value of its trade in its 
1993 peak (about $776,000) makes it difficult to guess if commerce in this 
type of product will continue to be important. 
Table 3.9 indicates that between 1989 and 1992 Colombian exports to Mexico 
have been characterized by the dominance of one group of products. Sugar 
and honey contributed 96 percent of this trade flow on average from 1989 to 
1991, while cotton accounted for 84 percent of it in 1992 (a year in which 
there were no exports of sugar and honey). In 1993, exports of fish (fresh, 
chilled, and frozen), which traditionally had a very low share, contributed 
42 percent of this trade flow resulting in an increase of its traded value of 
more than 40 times between 1992 and 1993.6 In the same year, exports of 
shell fish (fresh and frozen) appeared for the first time, accounting for 24 
percent of Colombian exports. Similarly, exports of crude vegetable 
materials radically expanded its share. Among Colombian exports to 
Mexico, there is no one single product that shows stability or a clear trend 
during the five years for which data are reported here. 
-

6 However, the value of these exports at their peak was less than $1 million. 
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Table 3.9	 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Colombia and Mexico 
(Importing Country: Mexico, Exporting Country: Colombia)" 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ASt CV# 
Fish, fresh / chilled / frozen 0.4 0.1 0.5 1.3 41.9 8.8 187.5 
Fish, salted/dried/smoked 8.1 1.6 
Shell fish, fresh/frozen 24.2 4.8 
Fruits, preserved/ prepared 0.1 1.5 3.7 1.1 148.5 
Sugar and honey 96.4 97.1 94.5 4.8 58.6 116.3 
Sugar confectionery 2.7 0.5 
Cotton 2.4 1.0 84.4 17.6 172.6 
Crude vegetable materials 0.9 1.5 3.7 4.8 22.8 6.7 119.1 
Other products 0.3 1.3 0.3 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
.. Percentages 
t Average share for the period 
# Coefficient of variation for the series of traded values 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Venezuelan agricultural exports to Mexico have been concentrated in the 
seeds for soft fixed oil group (group 222) as can be seen in Table 3.10. 
Characterized by relatively stable traded values, the largest variation 
occurred in 1992 when the Venezuelan agricultural exports to Mexico 
dropped 67 percent with respect to the previous year (to $354,000). 
Fluctuations in the share of this group are mainly due to the presence of 
sporadic exports of other products. 
-
'" 
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Table 3.10 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Mexico and Venezuela 
(Importing Country: Mexico, Exporting Country: Venezuela)" 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ASt CV# 
Fish, preser./prepared (037) 12.7 0.1 2.8 3.1 187.1 
Cereal preparations 3.5 29.2 6.5 196.0 
Sugar and honey (061) 90.2 18.0 
Edible products, nes (098)t 0.9 13.9 0.2 3.0 142.5 
Unmanufactured tobacco 36.9 7.4 
Seeds for soft fixed oil (222) 85.2 9.6 62.1 79.8 68.9 61.1 53.7 
Other products 2.1 0.3 1.7 0.8 99.5 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
.. Percentages 
t Average share for the period 
# Coefficient of variation for the series of traded values 
t not elsewhere specified (nes) 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Data on Mexican exports to Venezuela are presented in Table 3.11. As 
compared to Venezuelan exports to Mexico, this trade flow is more 
diversified in the sense that more than one group of products showed 
continuity during the period 1989-1993. However, only the edible products 
group had relative stability. Despite of the variability of its share within this 
trade flow, the traded value of Mexican exports of edible products to 
Venezuela increased from 1989 to 1992 and then, in 1993, underwent a 24 
percent reduction to 1.3 million dollars. Exports of vegetables (fresh and 
simply preserved) and sugar and honey have also been present during the 
-

whole period (those corresponding to vegetables in 1992 were only 0.05 
percent and do not appear in Table 3.11). Their share in this trade flow as 
well as their traded values, however, have fluctuated widely and do not 
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seem to have a recognizable pattern. Meat (fresh, chilled, and frozen), 
unmilled maize, and confectionery sugar entered this trade flow in 1993. 
Among them, maize was the most notable case as this product's share 
reached 50 percent with 2.6 million dollars. 
Table 3.11 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Mexico and Venezuela 
(Importing Country: Venezuela, Exporting Country: Mexico)'" 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 ASt CV# 
Bovine meat, fr. / chill. / froz 4.2 0.8 
Maize, unmilled 50.3 10.1 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserv 22.2 80.2 26.3 6.7 27.1 111.3 
Sugar and honey 70.0 0.9 8.5 14.5 6.6 20.1 147.4 
Sugar confectionery 6.9 1.4 
Edible products, nes (098) 4.4 16.5 47.8 77.4 24.4 34.1 64.2 
Crude vegetable materials 2.9 2.3 11.6 2.1 0.9 4.0 44.4 
Other products 0.4 0.2 5.7 6.0 2.5 260.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
... Percentages 
t Average share for the period 
# Coefficient of variation for the series of traded values 
t not elsewhere specified (nes) 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
3.4 Main Agricultural Products in Member Countries' Trade 
This section presents data on the general structure of agricultural trade for 
the G-3 partners and compares the share of its principal products (at the 
-

SITC's three-digit level) with that corresponding to intra-G-3 trade. The 
objective of this exercise is to help determine the significance of intra-G-3 
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agricultural trade for the G-3 member countries in the context of their 
agricultural trade. 
Table 3.12	 Main Agricultural Imports of Colombia and their Share in 
Agricultural Imports from G-3 Partners (Average Percentages for 
the period 1989-1993) 
Fish, prepared/preserved, nes (037)
 
Wheat, etc., unmilled (041)
 
Rice (042)
 
Barley, unmilled (043)
 
Maize, unmilled (044)
 
Cereals, nes, unmilled (045)
 
Cereal preparations (048)
 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserved (054)
 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dried (057)
 
Feeding stuff for animals (081)
 
Edible products, preparats., nes (098)
 
Seeds for soft fixed oil (222)
 
Seeds for other fixed oils (223)
 
Natural rubber, gums (231)
 
Cotton (263)
 
Crude vegetable materials (292)
 
Other products &
 
Total Agr.
 
Imports.
 
5.1 
25.3 
1.1 
4.0 
4.8 
1.6 
3.4 
7.4 
5.2 
8.9 
2.4 
5.1 
1.1 
5.6 
2.3 
5.5 
11.3 
Agric. Imp.
 
Mexicot
 
2.5 
5.5 
2.8 
1.2 
21.9 
11.2 
54.9 
f Agricultural Imports from Mexico 
:t: Agricultural Imports from Venezuela 
& Includes 29 groups of products each contributing less than 3 percent	 
­nes: not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
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Data presented in Table 3.12 shows that among the most important Mexican 
exports to Colombia (Table 3.8) only the groups of products corresponding to 
vegetables (fresh and simply preserved) and crude vegetable materials have 
some relevance within Colombian agricultural imports. Edible products, 
spices, and sugar and honey, which constitute 68 percent of Mexican exports 
to Colombia, have small or null shares within Colombian imports. 
Table 3.13	 Main Agricultural Exports of Colombia and their Share in 
Agricultural Exports to G-3 Partners (Average Percentages for the 
period 1989-1993) 
Total Agr. 
Exports. 
Agric. Exp. 
Mexico t 
Fish, fresh / chilled / frozen (034) 
Shell fish, fresh/frozen (036) 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dried (057) 
Fruits, preserved/prepared (058) 
Sugar and honey (061) 
Coffee and substitutes (071) 
Crude vegetable materials (292) 
Other products & 
1.7 
3.1 
14.8 
1.0 
4.8 
54.9 
11.4 
8.3 
8.8 
4.8 
1.1 
58.6 
6.7 
20.0 
+Agricultural Exports to Mexico 
t Agricultural Exports to Venezuela 
& Includes 38 groups of products each contributing less than 3 percent 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Three out of five of the most significant Colombian exports to Mexico also 
have importance for Colombia. Table 3.13 shows that the groups sugar and 
honey, crude vegetable materials, and shell fish (fresh/frozen) accounted for 
'", 
4.8, 11.4, and 3.1 percent of Colombian agricultural exports. Conversely, the 
-
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two remaining exports of importance have low or null shares in Colombian 
exports. Fish (fresh/chilled/frozen), which was the largest Colombian export 
to Mexico in 1993, contributed only 1.7 percent but has grown at a faster rate 
than Colombian agricultural exports. Cotton, on the other hand, does not 
appear to be a growing or important Colombian export. 
Table 3.14 shows that the group sugar and honey had the highest average 
share among Mexican imports from Colombia and also was an important 
agricultural import for Mexico. It appears to be the sixth largest agricultural 
import for this country. Cotton and crude vegetable materials, which are 
also among the main Mexican imports from Colombia, showed lower 
shares within Mexican imports. However, they still retained some relative 
importance. On the contrary, fish (fresh/chilled/frozen) and shell fish 
(fresh/ frozen) which account for 13.6 percent of Colombian exports to 
Mexico, do not show any significance among Mexican imports. 
As shown also in Table 3.14, the principal Venezuelan export to Mexico is 
also the product with the highest share among Mexican agricultural 
imports. Seeds for soft fixed oil represented more than 61 percent of 
Venezuelan exports on average and more than 11 percent of Mexican 
imports. Sugar and honey and cereal preparations that are also important 
Venezuelan exports to Mexico, show some significance as Mexican imports 
(although cereal preparations less than sugar and honey). Unmanufactured 
tobacco which was an important Venezuelan export to Mexico in 1991 is not 
a significant Mexican import. 
L 
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Table 3.14	 Main Agricultural Imports of Mexico 'and their Share in 
Agricultural Imports from G-3 Partners (Average Percentages for 
the period 1989-1993) 
Live animals for food (001)
 
Bovine meat, fr./chilled/frozen (011)
 
Other meat, fr./chilled/frozen (012)
 
Meat, prepared/preserved, nes (014)
 
Milk and cream (012)
 
Wheat, etc., unmilled (041)
 
Maize, unmilled (044)
 
Cereals, nes, unmilled (045)
 
Cereal preparations (048)
 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserved (054)
 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dried (057)
 
Sugar and honey (061)
 
Chocolate and products (073)
 
Feeding stuff for animals (081)
 
Edible products, preps, nes (098)
 
Seeds for soft fixed oil (222)
 
Cotton (263)
 
Crude vegetable materials (292)
 
Other products &
 
Total Agr.
 
Imports.
 
4.0 
5.2 
7.2 
1.3 
10.5 
2.5 
6.5 
9.0 
2.3 
3.1 
2.3 
5.5 
1.2 
4.8 
2.7 
11.3 
2.3 
2.9 
15.6 
Agric. Imp. Agric. Imp. 
Colombia t Venez.+ 
6.5 
58.6 18.0 
3.0 
61.1 
17.6 
6.7 
17.1 11.4 
t Agricultural Imports from Colombia 
+ Agricultural Imports from Venezuela 
& Includes 27 groups of products each contributing less than 3 percent 
nes: not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
.. 
94 
Table 3.15	 Main Agricultural Exports of Mexico and their Share in 
Agricultural Exports to G-3 Partners (Average Percentages for the 
Period 1989-1993) 
Total Agr. Agric. Exp. Agric. Exp. 
Exports. Colombiat Venez.:t: 
Live animals for food (001) 11.0 
Shell fish, fresh/ frozen (036) 9.3 
Fish, etc., prepared/preserved (037) 1.3 
Cereal preparations (048) 1.1 2.5 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserved (054) 29.1 5.5 27.1 
Vegetables, preserved/prepared (056) 2.4 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dried (057) 11.3 2.8 
Fruits, preserved/prepared (058) 1.5 
Coffee and substitutes (071) 13.1 3.6 
Edible products, preps., nes (098) 1.7 21.9 34.1 
Crude vegetable materials (292) 2.7 11.2 4.0 
Other products & 15.5 52.5 34.8 
+Agricultural Exports to Colombia 
:f: Agricultural Exports to Venezuela 
& Includes 31 groups of products each contributing less than 3 percent 
nes: not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Data in Table 3.15 show that the largest Mexican exports to Colombia do not 
have importance as Mexican agricultural exports. Sugar and spices are not 
valuable Mexican exports, while edible products and crude vegetable 
materials have relatively high growth rates but low shares. The only group 
-
of products that has importance in this trade flow and is significant to 
Mexican agricultural exports is vegetables (fresh/simply preserved). This 
group, in fact, constitutes the main agricultural export of Mexico. 
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The case of Mexican exports to Venezuela is similar to that of Colombia. 
The vegetables group (fresh/simply preserved), on average, is the second 
most important Mexican export to Venezuela and is the only one that has 
importance as a Mexican agricultural export. Edible products and crude 
vegetable materials appear as important exports to Venezuela. Sugar and 
honey and unmilled maize, which contribute to more than 30 percent of 
this trade flow, are not important among Mexican exports. 
Table 3.16 indicates that among the Mexican agricultural exports to 
Venezuela, the groups unmilled maize, vegetables (fresh/simply 
preserved), and sugar and honey have meaningful shares among 
Venezuelan imports. In contrast, edible products which were the largest 
Mexican export to Venezuela during the period 1989-1993, account only for 
one percent of Venezuelan agricultural imports. 
On the other hand, none of the Venezuelan exports to Mexico has 
importance among Venezuelan agricultural exports. Table 3.17 shows that 
the group seeds for soft fixed oils, which constitutes the basis of this trade 
flow, accounts only for 2.5 percent of Venezuelan agricultural exports. 
Similarly, cereal preparations and sugar and honey have low shares of 
Venezuelan exports. Trade of the latter group was targeted exclusively to 
Mexico and the same happened with a transient export of unmanufactured 
tobacco that did not suffice to put this product among the relevant 
-

Venezuelan exports. 
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Table 3.16	 Main Agricultural Imports of Venezuela and their Share in 
Agricultural Imports from G-3 Partners (Average Percentages for 
the period 1989-1993) 
Milk and cream (022)
 
Cheese and curd (024)
 
Wheat, etc., unmilled (041)
 
Maize, unmilled (044)
 
Cereals, nes, unmilled (045)
 
Cereal, etc., preparations (048)
 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserved (054)
 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dried (057)
 
Sugar and honey (061)
 
Feeding stuff for animals (081)
 
Edible products, preps., nes (098)
 
Seeds for soft fixed oils (222)
 
Cotton (263)
 
Other products &
 
Total Agr.
 
Imports.
 
10.7 
1.0 
20.0 
8.3 
3.1 
6.8 
7.1 
2.8 
5.9 
14.1 
1.0 
3.0 
4.2 
12.0 
Agric. Imp.
 
Mexico t
 
10.1 
27.1 
20.1 
34.1 
8.6 
t Agricultural Imports from Colombia 
t Agricultural Imports from Mexico 
& Includes 33 groups of products each contributing less than 3 percent 
nes: not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
-
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Table 3.17	 Main Agricultural Exports of Venezuela and their Share in 
Agricultural Exports to G-3 Partners (Average Percentages for the 
period 1989-1993) 
Bovine meat, fr./ chilled/frozen (011)
 
Fish, fresh/ chilled/frozen (034)
 
Shell fish, fresh/frozen (036)
 
Fish, etc., prepared/preserv., nes (037)
 
Rice (042)
 
Cereal, etc., preparations (048)
 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserved (054)
 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dried (057)
 
Fruits, preserved/prepared (058)
 
Sugar and honey (061)
 
Coffee and substitutes (071)
 
Cocoa (072)
 
Feeding stuff for animals (081)
 
Edible products, preps., nes (098)
 
Hides, skins, exc. furskins, raw (211)
 
Seeds for soft fixed oil (222)
 
Seeds for other fixed oils (223)
 
Other products &
 
Total Agr.
 
Exports.
 
6.1 
9.3 
13.8 
7.3 
2.2 
2.5 
2.1 
12.3 
4.0 
3.1 
8.0 
4.5 
2.4 
3.2 
2.4 
2.5 
1.5 
13.1 
Agric. Exp.
 
Mexico+
 
3.1 
6.5 
18.0 
3.0 
61.1 
8.3 
+Agricultural Exports to Colombia 
+ Agricultural Exports to Mexico 
& Includes 29 groups of products each contributing less than 3 percent 
nes: not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
-
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3.5 Trade Liberalization and Bilateral Trade Flows 
In determining the main groups of products whose trade flows are expected 
to be modified by the agreement, some criteria based on the information 
presented in the previous sections are employed. To be selected, a group of 
products must have had a share in its bilateral trade flow that were at least 5 
percent on average during the period 1989-1993. Second, it ought to have 
been of relative importance within the agricultural trade of one of the 
participating countries (that is, within the agricultural imports of the 
importing country or the agricultural exports of the exporting country?). 
Finally, to avoid the inclusion of products that had relatively important 
traded values for just one year, the criterion of having some permanence 
during the period was added (as was mentioned before, the instability of the 
G-3 agricultural trade allows for the emergence of products on a transitory 
basis but with a high share in the corresponding trade flow). 
By applying these criteria, the following sets of products were selected: (1) for 
trade flows from Mexico to Colombia, crude vegetable materials - group 292; 
(2) for trade flows from Colombia to Mexico, sugar and honey and crude 
vegetable materials - groups 061 and 292; (3) for trade flows from Venezuela 
to Mexico, seeds for soft fixed oil - group 222; and (4) for trade flows from 
Mexico to Venezuela, vegetables (fresh/simply preserved) and sugar and 
honey - groups 054 and 061. The traded value of these products accounted 
for an average of 40 percent of the aggregate bilateral trade between Mexico 
­
and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela during the period 1989-1993. If the 
7 The threshold level in this case was fixed at the 3 percent level. 
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criterion related to the permanence of trade were relaxed, 4 more products 
would be selected and the share of the whole group within aggregate 
bilateral trade would rise to 81 percents. 
To appraise the status of the selected groups of products under the G-3's 
tariff liberalization schedule it is necessary to get into the specific categories 
of products that are traded within each group. Trade flows from Mexico to 
Colombia correspond to the subgroup 292.4 that refers to "[p]lants or parts of 
plants (including seeds and fruits) of a kind used primarily in perfumery, in 
pharmacy, or for insecticidal, fungicidal or similar purposes, fresh or dried, 
whether or not cut, crushed or powdered" (United Nations, 1989). The 
sUbgroups important in trade flows from Colombia to Mexico correspond to 
codes 061.2 and 292.9. Subgroup 061.2 includes cane and beet sugar, other 
than raw, and chemically pure sucrose in solid form, whether or not 
containing added flavoring or coloring matter. Subgroup 292.9 comprises a 
subset of products characterized by the fact that they are vegetable materials 
of various kinds used for purposes such as stuffing or padding and 
manufacture of brooms and brushes. The subgroup also covers vegetable 
saps and extracts, pectic substances, and seaweed and other algae. 
Trade flows from Venezuela to Mexico only include subgroup 222.5 that 
corresponds to sesame seeds. On the other hand, trade flows from Mexico to 
8 These 4 products include vegetables in the case of flows from Mexico to 
­Colombia, shell fish for flows from Colombia to Mexico, sugar and honey 
for flows from Venezuela to Mexico, and unmilled maize for trade flows 
from Mexico to Venezuela (the latter is reported by Venezuela and do not 
appear in the Mexican statistics). All these products have importance just in 
one year during the analyzed period. 
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Venezuela include sUbgroups 054.2 and 061.9. Subgroup 054.2 embraces all 
leguminous vegetables, dried or shelled, whether skinned or split. 
Subgroup 061.9 contains sugars different from cane and beet sugars and 
molasses, such as pure lactose, maltose, glucose and fructose, in solid form 
as well as sugar syrups not containing added flavoring or coloring matter 
(artificial honey and caramel are included also). 
The status of these products under the G-3 is as follows (1) Vegetable 
materials for perfumery and pharmacy (subgroup 292.4) are included within 
the tariff elimination schedule. The respective starting tariffs were fixed at 
the 20 percent ad-valorem level for Mexico and 14.4 percent for Colombia 
and Venezuela. (2) Non-raw beet and cane sugar (subgroup 061.2) is initially 
excluded from trade liberalization. As mentioned above, a special 
agreement on quotas and tariffs for all sugar products is expected to be 
determined by an ad hoc committee. (3) Vegetable materials for different 
uses (subgroup 292.9) are scheduled for tariff elimination and the 
corresponding initial ad-valorem tariffs were set at 10 percent for Mexico 
and 7.2 percent for Colombia and Venezuela. (4) Sesame seed (subgroup 
222.5) is excluded from tariff elimination. However, Mexico applies no tariff 
charges on this product and therefore imports can enter this market duty 
free. (5) Leguminous vegetables (subgroup 054.2) are excluded from tariff 
elimination. Nonetheless, for some products in this subgroup a tariff 
reduction on ad-valorem duties was applied from the date in which the 
accord entered into effect. These reductions were fixed at 28 percent in the 
-

case of Mexico and 12 percent in the case of Colombia and Venezuela. (6) 
Lactose and other sugars (subgroup 061.9) are excluded from tariff 
elimination. For some of these products it was agreed to apply the same 
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tariff reductions mentioned in the previous case. However, the definitive 
situation of this subgroup within the G-3 is still to be defined by the ad hoc 
committee on sugar trade. 
The previous review shows that two out of the six most important products 
in bilateral trade between Mexico and Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela 
are scheduled for tariff elimination within the G-3. Two additional products 
benefited from tariff reductions (although one of them not completely) with 
respect to the level of regional tariff preferences previously accorded within 
the LAIA. Finally, the two remaining products are excluded from trade 
liberalization, one of them subject to programmed negotiations. In terms of 
their relevance in aggregated bilateral trade, the products that were included 
for liberalization account for 1.9 percent of this trade flow while the 
products that benefited from tariff reductions represent 10.3 percent of it. On 
the other hand, excluded products account for 27.4 percent. 
It is not possible at this point to have a clear idea of the likely impact of the 
G-3 on member countries' agricultural trade. Even if its effects remain 
confined to existing trade flows, assessing its consequences with the 
information so far presented is difficult. It is clear, however, that there does 
not seem to be a great potential for trade expansion in the case of the 
products that were included for tariff elimination; this is so both because of 
the size of their markets and their share in aggregate bilateral trade. In the 
case of the products that obtained tariff reductions (both exports from 
Mexico to Venezuela), the response of trade flows is unknown and will ­
depend greatly on variables such as exchange rate movements in both 
countries. The outcome for at least one of the excluded products will be 
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determined once the ad hoc committee arrives at a determination on how 
to treat sugar trade. In summary, leaving aside the effect of this decision, it 
would seem that the G-3 agreement is likely to have a very modest impact 
on member countries' agricultural trade. Only empirical verification can 
help to arrive at a more accurate assessment. 
-

,­
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Appendix 1
 
Standard International Trade Classification (SITC) Codes at the Two Digit
 
Level Included in the Definition of the Agricultural Sector
 
Table A-I.1	 SITC Division Codes Considered as Agricultural Sector 
(including number of groups -G-, sUbgroups -SG- and basic 
headings -BH-) 
Code	 Description of division heading G SG BH 
00 Live animals other than animals of division 03 1 6 11
 
01 Meat and meat preparations 4 17 38
 
02 Dairy products and birds' eggs 4 12 22
 
03 Fish (not marine mammals), crustaceans, mol­
luscs, and aquatic invertebrates and preparations. 4 14 47
 
04 Cereals and cereal preparations 8 21 34
 
05 Vegetables and fruit 5 27 96
 
06 Sugars, sugar preparations, and honey 2 7 17
 
07 Coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, and manufactures thereof 5 16 35
 
08 Feeding stuff for animals (not unmilled cereals) 1 6 26
 
09 Miscellaneous edible products and preparations 2 6 18
 
12 1 Tobacco and tobacco manufactures 2 6 8
 
21 Hides, skins, and furskins, raw 2 9 18
 
22 Oil seeds and oleaginous fruits 2 13 15
 
23 2 Crude rubber (including synthetic and reclaimed) 2 5 16
 
26 3 Textile fibers and their wastes 4 8 26 57
 
29 Crude animal and vegetable materials, n.e.s. 2 9 37
 
1 only group 121 (unmanufactured tobacco) was included 
2 only group 231 (natural rubber) was included 
3 only group 263 (cotton) was included 
4 includes fibers other than wool tops and other combed wool and excludes 
waste manufactured into yarn or fabric. 
-Source: U.N.	 Statistical Office (1986) Standard International Trade 
.. 
Classification. Revision 3 
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Appendix 2
 
G-3's Agricultural Trade Data
 
Table A-2.1 G-3 Countries' Total and Agricultural Trade ($ million) 
Total Imports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
5,010.5 
22,788.6 
7,029.6 
5,588.5 
28,066.3 
6,600.8 
4,967.0 
38,073.3 
10,037.6 
6,683.9 
47,877.9 
12,668.1 
9,840.8 
65,270.9 
11,266.6 
Agricultural Imports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
338.7 
3,534.9 
761.4 
392.5 
4,268.0 
613.3 
314.1 
4,046.1 
877.9 
637.8 
5,353.6 
1,052.8 
747.5 
5,205.2 
1,043.1 
Total Exports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
5,739.4 
23,046.0 
13,096.4 
6,765.0 
26,811.7 
18,044.3 
7,268.6 
26,956.7 
15,129.9 
6,916.1 
27,207.1 
14,235.3 
7,454.9 
51,698.2 
15,208.1 
Agricultural Exports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombia 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
2,411.7 
2,724.0 
233.8 
2,494.6 
2,996.6 
346.3 
2,695.7 
3,224.5 
250.7 
2,658.7 
2,895.6 
263.3 
2,516.3 
3,549.2 
350.3 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
-
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Table A-2.2 Intra-G-3+ Total and Agricultural Trade" ($ million) 
Intra-G-3 Imports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian G-3 Imports 116.3 113.6 157.9 205.1 250.6 
Mexican G-3 Imports 96.9 217.3 188.7 268.7 309.4 
Venezuelan G-3 Impts. 63.6 117.0 134.7 223.1 222.3 
Total G-3 Imports 276.8 447.9 481.3 696.9 782.3 
Intra-G-3 Agricultural Imports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian G-3 Ag. Imp. 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.8 3.0 
Mexican G-3 Ag. Impts. 6.4 38.0 2.5 2.1 4.7 
Venezuelan G-3 Ag. 1m. 4.1 3.2 1.2 2.1 4.0 
Total G-3 Agric. Impts. 11.3 42.0 4.6 6.0 11.7 
Intra-G-3 Exports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian G-3 Exports 24.8 38.5 52.4 71.0 83.8 
Mexican G-3 Exports 179.9 230.5 292.7 428.2 472.8 
Venezuelan G-3 Exports 72.1 178.8 136.2 197.6 225.6 
Total G-3 Exports 276.8 447.8 481.3 696.8 782.2 
Intra-G-3 Agricultural Exports: 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Colombian G-3 Ag. Exp. 4.4 7.6 0.8 1.6 1.5 
Mexican G-3 Ag. Expts. 4.9 4.0 2.1 3.9 7.0 
Venezuelan G-3 Ag. Ex. 2.0 30.4 1.7 0.4 3.2 
Total G-3 Agric. Exports 11.3 42.0 4.6 5.9 11.7 
+ Intra-G-3 trade comprises bilateral trade flows among Mexico and 
Colombia and Mexico and Venezuela 
.. Due to inconsistencies between data reported by the different countries, 
bilateral flows were averaged. 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
-
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Table A-2.3	 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Colombia and 
Mexico. Importing Country: Colombia, Exporting Country: 
Mexico. ($000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Cereal preparations 0 0 26.4 53.3 201.0 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserv 0 7.1 0 14.7 776.1 
Fruits and nuts, fresh/ dry 26.0 13.2 33.5 35.3 119.5 
Fruit/Vegetable juices 0 0 0 123.6 231.3 
Sugar and honey 522.3 229.2 378.5 779.5 595.0 
Coffee and substitutes 0 0 142.8 50.0 0 
Spices 36.4 171.3 23.9 85.6 102.9 
Feeding stuff for animals 0 0 19.1 16.8 94.5 
Edible products, nes (098)t 127.8 168.7 210.0 462.0 767.0 
Crude vegetable materials 125.1 120.7 117.5 166.7 133.9 
t not elsewhere specified 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Table A-2.4	 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Colombia and 
Mexico. Importing Country: Mexico, Exporting Country: 
Colombia. ($000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Fish, fresh / chilled/ frozen 
Fish, salted/dried/smoked 
Shell fish, fresh/ frozen 
Fruits, preserved / prepared 
Sugar and honey 
Sugar confectionery 
Cotton 
Crude vegetable materials 
17.5 
0 
0 
0 
4,247.4 
0 
104.0 
39.4 
8.7 
0 
0 
0 
7,389.6 
0 
76.3 
110.7 
3.6 
0 
0 
0.8 
725.2 
0 
0 
28.4 
21.7 
136.8 
0 
25.0 
0 
0 
1,434.8 
81.8 
973.0 
0 
561.0 
85.6 
111.0 
62.8 
0 
529.5 
-
,­
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
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Table A-2.5	 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Mexico and 
Venezuela. Importing Country: Mexico, Exporting Country: 
Venezuela. ($000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
253.1 0 1.5 12.6 0Fish, preserv./prepar. (037) 
Cereal preparations 0 0 0 15.3 938.2 
Sugar and honey (061) 0 27,427.4 0 0 0 
Edible products, nes (098)+ 0 0 15.1 61.5 5.0 
Unmanufactured tobacco 0 0 634.9 0 0 
Seeds for soft fixed oil (222) 1,702.9 2,907.2 1,067.3 353.7 2,212.5 
+not elsewhere specified (nes) 
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
Table A-2.6	 Main Products in Bilateral Trade between Mexico and 
Venezuela. Importing Country: Venezuela, Exporting 
Country: Mexico. ($000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Bovine meat, fr./chill./froz 0 0 0 0 217.5 
Maize, unmilled 0 0 0 0 2,592.1 
Vegetables, fresh/so preserv 906.8 2,569.9 308.8 0.1 346.5 
Sugar and honey 2,854.3 27.2 100.3 308.4 341.3 
Sugar confectionery 0 0 0 0 355.8 
Edible products, nes (098) 180.7 529.0 561.5 1,649.5 1,256.5 
Crude vegetable materials 118.3 73.0 136.4 45.5 46.3 
+not elsewhere specified (nes) ­
Source: U.N. (see References section) 
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A-2.1 Agricultural Trade Between Mexico and Colombia (original data) 
Table A-2.7 Colombian Imports from Mexico - Reported by Colombia 
(values in U.S. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total Agric. Imports 338,670.5 392,465.1 314,075.6 637,778.8 747,524.3 
Agr. Impts. from Mexic. 852 1,018.4 1,088.8 2,132.9 3,320.5 
Cereal preparations 52.8 106.6 584.3 
Vegetables, fresh/presv. 14.2 29.4 882.2 
Fruits, fresh/ dried 52 26.3 66.9 70.5 123.9 
Fruits, preserv. / prepar. 122.2 288.5 
Sugar and honey 494.5 298.4 544 922.9 683.9 
Coffee and substitutes 98.6 99.9 
Spices 72.7 200.5 47.8 171.2 104.8 
Feeding stuff for animal 19.1 16.8 94.5 
Edible products 112.6 161.3 128.1 317.9 339.5 
Crude vegetable materls 120.2 135.3 97.9 209.3 129.8 
Table A-2.8 Colombian Exports to Mexico - Reported by Colombia 
(values in U.S. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total Agric. Exports 
Agr. Exports to Mexico 
Fish, fresh/chilled/froz. 
Fish, salt. / dried / smok. 
Fruits, preserv/prepar. 
Sugar and honey 
Sugar candy, non-choco. 
Cotton 
Crude vegetable materls 
5,739,442 6,765,037 7,268,643 
4,666 7,293.7 959.2 
17.5 8.7 3.6 
0.8 
4,361.8 6,979.2 874.4 
207.9 152.5 
78.8 100.4 56.7 
6,916,051 
1,464.1 
21.7 
136.8 
25 
1,242.5 
26.5 
7,454,865 
1,201.1 
973 
85.6 
62.8 
-
,. 
109 
Table A-2.9 Mexican Imports from Colombia - Reported by Mexico 
(values in U.s. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total Agric. Imports 3,534,904 4,267,965 4,046,133 5,353,637 5,205,157 
Agr. Imps. from Colom. 4,133 7,921 576 1,764 1,842 
Shell fish, fresh/ frozen 561 
Sugar and honey 4,133 7,800 576 222 
Cotton 1,627 
Crude vegetable rnaterls 121 137 1,059 
Table A-2.10 Mexican Exports to Colombia - Reported by Mexico (values 
in U.S. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total Agric. Exports 2,725,976 2,996,624 3,224,455 2,895,621 3,549,164 
Agr. Exports to Colomb. 823 584 777 1,391 2,717 
Cereal preparations 261 
Vegetables, fresh/presd. 670 
Fruits, fresh/ dried 115 
Fruit and veg. juices 125 174 
Sugar and honey 550 160 213 636 506 
Coffee and substitutes 187 
Spices 142 101 
Edible products 143 176 240 506 752 
Crude vegetable materls 130 106 137 124 138 
-
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A-2.2 Agricultural Trade Between Mexico and Venezuela (original data) 
Table A-2.11 Venezuelan Imports from Mexico - Reported by Venezuela 
(values in U.S. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
 
Total Agric. Imports 761,413.1 613,278.4 877,903.5 1,052,751 1,043,067 
Agr. Impts. from Mexic. 3,388.2 3,112.1 1,472.8 2,529.1 5,601.8 
Maize, unmilled 2,592.1 
Cereal preparations 1.9 103.2 78.3 425.6 218.5 
Vegetables, fresh / presv. 901.5 2,317.8 373.5 0.1 397.9 
Sugar and honey 2,140.5 54.3 200.6 373.7 325.5 
Edible products 181.4 476 514.6 1,460.9 1,047.5 
Crude vegetable materls 130.6 145.9 172.7 90.9 92.6 
Other products ... 32.3 14.9 133.1 177.9 927.7 
... Includes 11 groups of products, each contributing less than 5 percent to 
agricultural imports from Mexico 
Table A-2.12	 Venezuelan Exports to Mexico - Reported by Venezuela 
(values in U.s. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total Agric. Exports 233,812.1 346,308.8 250,709.4 263,333.7 350,280.1 
Agr. Exports. to Mexico 2,809.8 3,3671.2 1,653.5 360.4 3,293.6 
Fish, prepared / preservd 330.2 3 25.1 
Cereal preparations 30.6 698.4 
Sugar and honey 30,298.7 
Edible products 15.1 61.5 5 
Tobacco, unmanufact. 558.8 ~ 
Seeds for 'soft' fixed oil 2,395.8 3,219.4 1,067.5 194.4 2,477.9 
Other products ... 83.8 153.1 9.1 48.8 112.3 
-
... Includes 8 groups of products, each contributing less than 5 percent to 
agricultural exports to Mexico 
111 
Table A-2.13 Mexican Imports from Venezuela - Reported by Mexico 
(values in U.S. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
 
Total Agric. Imports 3,534,904 4,267,965 4,046,133 5,353,637 5,205,157 
Agr. Imp. from Venez. 1,186 27,151 1,778 513 3,125 
Fish, prepared / preservd 176 
Cereal preparations 1,178 
Sugar and honey 24,556 
Tobacco, unmanufact. 711 
Seeds for 'soft' fixed oil 1,010 2,595 1,067 513 1,947 
Table A-2.14 Mexican Exports to Venezuela - Reported by Mexico (values 
in U.S. $000) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Total Agric. Exports 2,725,976 2,996,624 3,224,455 2,895,621 3,549,164 
Agr. Exports. to Venez. 4,766 3,297 875 1,733 2,454 
Meat, 242 
fresh / chilled / froz. 
Vegetables, fresh/presv. 912 2,822 244 295 
Sugar and honey 3,568 243 357 
Sugar candy, non-choco. 312 
Edible products 180 475 531 1,490 1,248 
Crude vegetable materls 106 100 
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